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Abstract: 
 
 
The critical assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in MENA includes the 
following areas for achieving capabilities enhancement (i) Macroeconomic framework 
component: Analysis of the evolution and nature of macroeconomic policies and their inter-
relationships with trade policy and their effects on MDGs and human development; (ii) F iscal 
component, the effects of trade reform and policies on the fiscal position of the countries and its 
relation with MDGs¶H[SHQGLWXUHV needs and potential constraining effect on the application of 
flanking policies; (iii) Institutional component: assessing institutional capacity and performance 
of trade- and finance-related institutions in particular and their effect on economic, social and 
political outcomes: (iv) Dynamic effects component, undertaking specific studies to assess 
spillovers and externalities brought about by various policies, particularly trade, financial and 
investment policies; and; (v) Intellectual property rights component assessing the effects of 
more stringent protection of IPRs on MDGs and human development indicators. I evaluate 
critically the neoliberal approach to these aspects of development and capabilities in the MENA 
region generally and with a  special case study of Egypt.  
 
A socially and politically oriented capabilities approach integrates poverty and social impact 
analysis (PSIA) techniques, economic and technical tools of ex-ante and ex-post assessment, and 
monitoring and evaluation methodologies in a comprehensive manner. Accordingly, it begins by 
identifying interested stakeholders and asking questions regarding facilitating and coordinating 
their participation as well as building institutional arrangements that will assure sustainability of 
the human development process. A related aspect is the need for documenting and analyzing 
local historical settings including social and political movements such as those in Egypt. Finally, 
progress towards collecting data and building a database of relevant indicators, and developing 
tools of monitoring and evaluation along with the development of the institutional and technical 
capability of stakeholders are examined within a dynamic historical context of democratization. 
Building on other experiences of participatory assessment of different policies, the approach I 
advocate--- besides producing empirical analysis--- is intended to engage all actors involved 
(government, business, labour, and civil society institutions representing different segments of 
the population, in particular women) in active participation within a deeply democratic social 
and political context. Therefore, such efforts require continuous democratic institution building. 
The revolution in Egypt is evaluated from this socially and politically oriented capabilities 
perspective. 
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1. IN T R O DU C T I O N 
This critical assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in MENA includes the 
following areas for achieving capabilities enhancement (i) Macroeconomic framework 
component: Analysis of the evolution and nature of macroeconomic policies and their inter-
relationships with trade policy and their effects on MDGs and human development; (ii) F iscal 
component, the effects of trade reform and policies on the fiscal position of the countries and its 
relation with MDGs¶H[SHQGLWXUHV needs and potential constraining effect on the application of 
flanking policies; (iii) Institutional component: assessing institutional capacity and performance 
of trade- and finance-related institutions in particular and their effect on economic, social and 
political outcomes: (iv) Dynamic effects component, undertaking specific studies to assess 
spillovers and externalities brought about by various policies, particularly trade, financial and 
investment policies; and; (v) Intellectual property rights component assessing the effects of 
more stringent protection of IPRs on MDGs and human development indicators. I evaluate 
critically the neoliberal approach to these aspects of development and capabilities in the MENA 
region generally and with a  special case study of Egypt.  
 
This paper is organized in three main parts. In the first, theoretical part, I discuss an extension of 
the capabilities approach to a fully social and political theoretical framework that will be 
VXEVHTXHQWO\DSSOLHGWRWKH(J\SWLDQFDVHVWXG\FRQFUHWHO\$PDUW\D6HQ¶VSLRQHHULQJ
contributions contra utilitarian welfarism and more recent extensions including the controversial 
listing issue are discussed in appendix one as part of a partial historical background to 
capabilities approach.1 I put particular emphasis on social and political aspects of capabilities 
both because of their general relevance and also because of their particular relevance to the 
MENA region in light of recent political and social upheavals, particularly in Egypt which is the 
special focus here. In the second part of this paper, I discuss a country model approach advocated 
by Amsden and others by discussing some lessons from the East Asian development experience 
in creating structures of learning and capabilities enhancement. In the last part, I focus on Egypt 
after a brief preliminary discussion of the MENA region.The reader who is pressed for time may 
proceed immediately to the second and third  parts. 
I focus critically on  assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in MENA in 
the above areas in order to highlight the ambiguities of the neoliberal approach  and its real costs 
for the MENA economies in human capabilities terms. Although the real focus concretely is on 
Egypt for the most part, many of the assessments carry over to most other MENA economies as 
                                                                                                                    
1   Major references to the capabilities literature---SDUWLFXODUO\ 6HQ¶V SLRQHHULQJ FRQWULEXWLRQV--- are  also given 
separately as references to the appendices at the end. See also in particular about the thin and thick 
conceptualizations of capabilities--- M. Quizilbash, Interpreting the Capability Approach: ThiQDQG7KLFN9LHZVெ
Human Rights Defender 19 (1): March 2010 pp. 5-7. See also the special issue of Journal of Human Development, 
9RO1R1RYRQFDSDELOLWLHVDQG4XL]LOEDVK¶V LQWURGXFWLRQ. Appendix 4 of the present paper shows the 
links between a fully social concept of capabilities and the building of movements for deep democracy in the MENA 
region . Also see, Haider A. Khan, Technology, Development and Democracy, Edward Elgar, 1998, chs. 6 an7 in 
particular and Khan (2003a). Technology and Modernity: Creating Social Capabilities in a POLIS. In Misa T ed. 
Technology and Modernity, Cambridge: The MIT Press, Chapter12. 
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well. Following the analysis of the Egyptian case here will enable us to pursue the task of 
building country-specific capabilities evaluation frameworks and models where human 
development indicators and other indicators of well-being can be analyzed in detail and depth. In 
this preliminary attempt, I have already found that there are many gaps and misdirected policy 
commitments, particularly in Egypt but in other countries as well. 
 
My approach integrates poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) techniques, economic and 
technical tools of ex-ante and ex-post assessment, and monitoring and evaluation methodologies 
in a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, it begins by identifying interested stakeholders and 
asking questions regarding facilitating and coordinating their participation as well as building 
institutional arrangements that will assure sustainability of the human development process. A 
related aspect is the need for documenting and analyzing local historical settings. Finally, 
progress towards collecting data and building a database of relevant indicators, and developing 
tools of monitoring and evaluation along with the development of the institutional and technical 
capability of stakeholders are examined. Building on other experiences of participatory 
assessment of different policies, the approach I advocate, besides producing empirical analysis, 
is intended to engage all actors involved (government, business, labour, and civil society 
institutions representing different segments of the population, in particular women) in active 
participation. 
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Part I :  
 
 
 
 
1. THE ROLE OF A NETWORK OF INSTITUTIONS IN CREATING 
SOCIAL CAPABILITIES: FREEDOM AS THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL 
CAPABILITIES EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
From the normative analysis of Sen and others it would appear that a nuanced, broad 
consequentialism of the sort Sen advocates --- µD JRDO ULJKWV V\VWHPZLWK FRQVHTXHQFH-based 
UHDVRQLQJ¶---LVVXSHULRUWRDQDUURZGHRQWRORJLFDOYLHZRIULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVXFKDV1R]LFN¶V
But the modern Hegel-Marx connections push us further in the direction of a critical assessment 
of institutions and the need for radical institutional change if necessary. The necessity for such 
changes is obvious in predatory regimes such as the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, or Saudi 
Arabia under its corrupt princes. But a wide range of institutional changes are necessary even in 
formally democratic regimes such as India, or Bangladesh. 
 
The central point about deepening democracy for capabilities enhancement is that it is a 
network of institutions, and not just an agenda for piecemeal reforms. Although individual 
reforms are welcome and to be supported vigorously, a movement for deep democracy must 
advocate deeper, systemic changes along with the specific reforms that people are fighting for at 
any given moment.  Therefore, the role of the new social and political movements such as the 
ones in Egypt is, from this perspective, positive and encouraging; but in order to be fully 
effective, these movements must have a deep democratic agenda and fight for it openly. 
 
The network of social political and economic institutions necessary for promoting such 
well-being freedoms and agency freedoms as are necessary for the full self-determination can be 
both historically and culturally specific. However, they must involve the provisioning of 
adequate amount of resources and safeguards. Along with the constitutionally liberal guarantees 
of physical safety and freedom from arbitrary coercion, there must be positive guarantees of 
being able to pursue a political life of citizenship that gives social and political opportunities to 
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all. In the age of globalization, this implies, ultimately, that nothing short of a global charter of 
rights for all humans with implementing institutions at both international, national and local 
levels are called for. 
 
This may seem hopelessly utopian to many. Therefore, let me observe that the strategic 
positioning of fighting for a global citizenship does not negate the many small, local struggles for 
extending well-being and agency freedoms, but rather the strategy is predicated upon active 
participation in whatever capacity it is possible, across the national boundaries in these myriads 
of ongoing struggles. The more farsighted people in the anti-globalization movements around the 
globe are already moving in this direction. The positive policy changes from above for 
promotion of the capabilities of the disadvantaged in particular--- by the International Financial 
Institutions, developed country governments and developing country governments--- are always 
welcome developments; however, the partial and limited nature of these policy initiatives need to 
be recognized. It is also doubtful that without mass democratic movements from below even 
limited reforms from the above will be forthcoming. 
The economic struggles for better wages and working conditions in both domestic and 
transnational firms are of great significance in the age of globalization. The social capabilities 
will remain greatly stunted even under conditions of full employment if  low wages and 
dangerous, unhealthy working conditions are the norm. A more radical step which is consistent 
with the logic of development as freedom is the overcoming of domination in the work place.2 
Such struggles for the overcoming of domination in the work place can then be connected with 
the broader democratic movements around the world. 
 
The important point that emerges from this perspective is that freedom is positive, 
concrete and dynamic. It is positive in the sense of alerting us to the need for promoting social 
capabilities. It is concrete in two senses. One is the concreteness in the identification of specific 
IXQFWLRQLQJVDQGFDSDELOLWLHVWKDWWKHµGHYHORSPHQWDVIUHHGRP¶DSSURDFKFDOOVIRUH[SOLFLWO\7KH
second concrete aspect--- KHUHIUHHGRPLVILQDOO\DµFRQFUHWHXQLYHUVDO¶LQ+HJHO¶VWHUPLQRORJ\--
- is the absolute necessity to embody social freedom in concrete, interrelated, historically specific 
social, political and economic institutions. It is dynamic in the sense that such institutions and to 
some extent, the idea of freedom itself may undergo further changes in the direction of 
promoting further capabilities as the future unfolds. In the next section, a concrete illustration of 
WKLVLGHDLVDWWHPSWHGE\ORRNLQJDWWKHSUREOHPVRIZRPHQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHV Needless to say, this is 
particularly relevant in the context of MENA. 
                                                                                                                    
2 See McCamant(2003) for a discussion of domination and unequal exchange. 
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 :20(1¶6&$3$%,/,7,(63520O T I O N AS A SPE C I A L PO L I C Y I MPE R A T I V E : 
PR ESE N T T ASKS A ND A M O V E M E N T T O W A RDS T H E F U T UR E 
 
:LWKLQ WKLV SURMHFW RI SURPRWLQJ JOREDO µGHHS GHPRFUDF\¶ WKURXJK WKH SURJUHVVLYH
equalization and enhancement of social capabilities defended above, certain items such as 
ecological justice, sharing of wealth across borders and gender justice have proved to have both 
logical and normative salience. Here, I develop one theme--- namely, the problem of developing 
ZRPHQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHVDVDQ LPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRIJOREDO MXVWLFH--- as an example to illustrate the 
practical relevance of the capabilities approach. 
 
+HUHWRRWKHWZRLPSRUWDQWPRGHUQSLRQHHUVDUH6HQDQG1XVVEDXP6HQ¶V,QHTXDOLW\
Reexamined has an important chapter on Gender and Capabilities. Sen has contributed to a 
rigorous examination of the connections between gender and capabilities both conceptually and 
through empirical work in collaboration with others. Women, Culture and Development--- 
1XVVEDXP¶V HGLWHG YROXPH ZLWK -RQDWKDQ *ORYHU DV WKH FRHGLWRU--- is another landmark 
contribution to the field of gender and development. Nussbaum (2000) is also a most 
illuminating contribution, but here I will focus on the pioneering 1995 edited volume for the 
most part. Incidentally, Nussbaum (1995) also takes issue with certain relativist postmodern 
FULWLFLVPV RI µHVVHQWLDOLVP¶ DQG GHIHQGV DQ$ULVWRWOHDQ µHVVHQWLDOLVW¶ FRQFHSWLRQ RI FDSDELOLWLHV
here as well. Jonathan Glover contributes a baODQFHGDQGMXGLFLRXVHVVD\GHIHQGLQJµUHDVRQDEOH¶
LQWHUYHQWLRQVZKLOHDYRLGLQJµSROLF\LPSHULDOLVP¶IURPDERYH7KHUHLVDOVRDQLPSRUWDQWHVVD\
E\6HQRQJHQGHULQHTXDOLW\DQGWKHRULHVRIMXVWLFHLQWKHWKLUGSDUWRIWKHERRN'DYLG&URFNHU¶V
clarifying essay on the concept of capabilities is illuminating in several respects. 
 
7KHERRNEHJLQVZLWKDFRQFUHWHFDVHVWXG\RIZRPHQ¶VULJKWWRHPSOR\PHQWLQ,QGLDDQG
Bangladesh based on her fieldwork by Martha Chen. Apart from the editors, a number of 
different SHUVSHFWLYHVRQPHWKRGRORJ\DQGIRXQGDWLRQVRIFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJZRPHQ¶VHTXDOLW\DUH
SUHVHQWHG )RU H[DPSOH 2QRUD 2¶1HLOO SUHVHQWV D YLJRURXV FDVH DJDLQVW XVLQJ SUHIHUHQFH
satisfaction as the normative criterion in economics. She couples this with an equally vigorous 
defense of the capabilities approach. She is, however, a Kantian and weaves skillfully the 
capabilities approach with a form of the Kantian principle that we not act on principles that can 
not be acted upon by all and argues that such a Kantian principle can serve as a valuable test for 
YLDEOH VRFLDO SROLFLHV +HU DUJXPHQWV UHVXOW LQ VKRZLQJ WKDW YLFWLPL]DWLRQ µE\ YLROHQFH E\
coercion, by intimidation, is simply unacceptable. Inter alia, this is also a powerful condemnation 
of the victimization of women. 
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, KDYH DOUHDG\ PHQWLRQHG 'DYLG &URFNHU¶V PHWLFXORXV HVVD\ RQ WKH FRQFHSW RI
FDSDELOLWLHV+LODU\3XWQDPDOVRGHIHQGVDSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKFORVH WR -RKQ'HZH\¶VSRVLWLRQ
that there could be a rational basis for articulating and holding onto an ethical position. 
Although, as Linda Alcoff points out in her comments, some feminists have followed 
SKLORVRSKHUV VXFK DV 1LHW]VFKH DQG )RXFDXOW LQ RUGHU WR FULWLFL]H WKH NLQG RI µUDWLRQDOLVWLF¶
approach Putnam defends, the point that democratic processes DUH QHFHVVDU\ LQ 3XWQDP¶V
argument seems to be intact. In my defense of a deeper form of democracy, I have emphasized 
the need for respecting differences, and the role of power and desire as well, without making the 
last two items either epiphenomena or overwhelmingly arbitrary. Indeed, the recognition of the 
µ'LRQ\VLDQ¶ DVSHFWV RI KXPDQ QDWXUH OHDGV WR WKH QHHG IRU D VWUXFWXUH DQG SURFHGXUHV IRU
democracy that will both protect individuals from tyranny and promote their social capabilities in 
an interactive, causally reciprocal and efficacious manner. 
 
Respecting differences among cultures does not preclude a consideration of cross-cultural 
standards of justice. This is an important conclusion drawn by Seyla Benhabib in the Nussbaum-
Glover volume. There are internal debates within each culture about justice, as Sen and others 
have also pointed out. There may be sufficient common ground among seemingly different 
cultures in their critical and reflective discourses on ethics and justice. This points to the 
poVVLELOLW\RIGLVFXVVLQJZRPHQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHVIURPDJOREDODQGREMHFWLYHSHUVSHFWLYH7KHUHDUH
a number of other essays--- conceptual and empirical--- including the highly relevant and 
LPSRUWDQWHVVD\V LQSDUW LYZKLFKJLYH UHJLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHVRQZRPHQ¶s equality from China, 
Mexico, India and Africa. 
 
From matters of basic functionings such as health and survival to issues related to 
political voice--- in short, the whole spectrum of functionings related to self-determination--- 
there is by now compelling recorded evidence of discrimination against women almost 
everywhere in the world. In developing countries, along with general discrimination, there are 
also important regional variations. Even with great poverty, sub-Saharan Africa shows less 
gender discrimination in basic health matters than the wealthy Indian state of the Punjab, for 
example.  This also allows us to illustrate the severity of such discrimination in some Asian 
countries in particular. 
 
For example, the female-male ratio in sub-Saharan Africa is 102.2 to 100. The same ratio 
for many Asian, Latin American and North African countries is much lower--- in fact the female 
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percentage is less than male percentage. In order to dramatize the issue, Sen has expressed this 
gap as the absolute number RI µPLVVLQJ ZRPHQ¶ )ROORZLQJ WKLV DSSURDFK LQ WKH V WKH
number of missing women in Southeast Asia was 2.4 million; in Latin America it was 4.4 
million; in North Africa, 2.4 million; in Iran, 1.4 million; in China 44 million; in India 36.7 
million; in West Asia, 4.3 million. 
 
According to Dreze and Sen (1989), in India there are more girls dying than boys, i.e. 
mortality rates are higher for the girls. Additionally, the mortality rates are higher for women 
than men in all age groups until the late 30s. As Chen, Nussbaum and others have pointed out, 
income poverty alone cannot explain this tragic fact. Social and political arrangements including 
what commonly goes under the names of customs and culture are also implicated. The limits of 
cultural relativLVPEHFRPHDSSDUHQWLQVXFKDGHILQLQJFDVHDVZRPHQ¶VPRUWDOLW\,QFUHDVLQJO\
the women and the poor themselves are speaking out and asking for solutions (Narayan 2000). 
 
'RHVWKLVLPSO\WKDWµHQOLJKWHQHG¶SROLF\PDNHUVDQGµIRUHLJQDLG¶ZRUNHUVLQFOXGLQg the 
NGOs have the moral right to impose their policies on the women in poor communities? Far 
from it. What we really need are new institutions inclusive of women, led by them locally and 
working cooperatively with the other democratic institutions. In other words, promotion of deep 
democracy at the local level with active participation and leadership from local women is a 
necessary condition. 
 
It is also an implication of this type of policy and institutional approach that a serious 
attempt must be made to collect and interpret the relevant information regarding the functionings 
and capabilities of women. Indicators such as life expectancy, females as a percentage of total 
population and other demographic data are, needless to say, as relevant as ever. Social indicators 
for education and rights to participate in social life are also crucial. But, in addition, political 
indicators of democratic rights and democratic participation are of great importance. Only when 
women have the rights and are actually participating at all levels of political organization, and 
indeed leading many of them, is it possible to claim that positive political freedoms for women 
DUHDQDFWXDOLW\,Q0(1$DVDUHJLRQWKHSURJUHVVWRZDUGVHQKDQFLQJZRPHQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHVKDV
been uneven. We now turn to these concrete issues regarding capabilities in MENA and 
particularly, Egypt after discussing a general heterodox approach to the idea of development 
partly based on the East Asian experience. 
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Part I I : Capabilities in M E N A : A General Approach based on the East Asian 
Experience and  The Egyptian Case 
As mentioned before, the main characteristics of the approach to capabilities in the region are 
clear. The assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in MENA includes the 
following areas for achieving the desired results: (i) Macroeconomic framework component: 
Analysis of the evolution and nature of macroeconomic policies and their inter-relationships 
with trade, finance and other policies and their effects on MDGs and human development; (ii) 
F iscal component, the effects of trade and financial reform and policies on the fiscal position of 
the countries and its relation with MDGs expenditures needs and potential constraining effect on 
the application of flanking policies; (iii) Institutional component: assessing institutional capacity 
and performance of trade-related institutions and their effect on trade outcomes: (iv) Dynamic 
effects component, undertaking specific studies to assess spillovers and externalities brought 
about by policies including trade, financial and investment policies; and; (v) Intellectual 
property rights component assessing the effects of more stringent protection of IPRs on MDGs 
and human development indicators.  
 
However, these components must be viewed as part of a coherent development strategy. It may 
be helpful here to contrast a holistic capabilities strategy with narrower ones. I now turn to this 
task before focusing on MENA and Egypt. Because Korea has been one of the more successful 
cases of development with equity, I discuss these issues in the Korean context for the sake of a 
concrete context.3 
In the rest of this paper, I will be referring to three concepts of development that are implicit in 
much of the  discussion in the field of industrialization and development. The first is the idea of 
development as growth with some structural change or at least the idea that this type of growth is 
the most crucial necessary condition for development. The second concept is derived by adding 
explicit distributional elements to growth--- particularly inequality and poverty. Both these ideas 
are shared by the development economists today ---at least implicitly. In a recent contribution,  
Peter Warr is explicit in discussing all three---growth, absolute poverty and inequality4--- and his 
thoughtful essay alerts the reader to the performance of Thailand in all three areas and derives--- 
at least partly---  a logic of further necessary reforms following from his cogent analysis of the 
three aspects of development in this sense. .  He concludes: 
 
 
Not all aspects of the Thai development strategy have been similarly successful. 
                                                                                                                    
3 For a technical formal description of how to enhance growth and capabilities with innovation, see appendices 2 and 
3. 
4 $WOHDVWVLQFHWKH0F1DPDUDSHULRGLQWKHVWKH:RUOG%DQNWRRNWKHOHDGLQDGYRFDWLQJ³UHGLVWULEXWLRQZLWK
JURZWK´,/2DQG81&7$'DOVRIROORZHGVXLWDQGKDGVWURQJHUOLQHVRIDUJXPHQWSen did his earlier work on 
poverty in the 70s  under ILO sponsorship. UNIDO and ECLAC both had  always advocated industrialization and 
equity. 
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Inequality has increased at the same time as absolute poverty has declined. The underlying causes of this 
increase in inequality are still not well understood. (Warr 2008, p.22)5 
 
The third--- and the broadest approach to development discussed and applied here--- is in terms 
of Sen's idea of capabilities and its further extensions. In this view, as discussed 
before,development is really an extension over time and space of freedom,particularly the 
positive freedom to lead a certain type of life an individual has reasons to value. In technical 
modeling of industrialization and development (including my own models---see appendixes) 
often this normative view is not adopted explicitly. Yet, in so far as there is a normative aspect 
about development being a "(public) good" that is a premise for the whole project of 
industrialization and development such a view is consistent with the modeling approaches as 
well. In a recent essay prepared for WIDER, a Korean scholar Keun Lee's perceptive comments 
on the possible role of democracy in development extends considerably the terrain of discussion 
in the direction of the "development as freedom" perspective when he writes: 
We see obvious advantages in democracy, amongst which is the convenient feature that citizens are not 
subject to arbitrary arrest and torture. Truly strong states get it wrong more often than they get it right. 
Thus the military dictatorships of Latin America left little in the way of legacy ,whereas the military 
dictatorships in Korea and Taiwan (while not on anything like the same scale of brutality) left a powerful 
legacy of development. The difference lies clearly in strategic orientation and in institutional capacity in 
formulating and implementing a program of national industrial development. Our point is that this is an 
option available to the political leadership of any developing country today. On top of this, the key to the 
Korean or Asian success was institutional longevity. (Lee 2008, p. 13) 
  
It would seem, therefore, that there is an implicit agreement in at least the post-1970 thinking  
that development is "growth plus" other things. While the list of "other things" may vary 
somewhat, none of the researchers in the field today would equate growth and development. 
Yet, as almost  all would agree that generating high growth may be a useful means towards 
development. Many thoughtful researchers  also pay some attention to what can be called "the 
political economy of growth and distribution" 
 
                                                                                                                    
5 See also Warr(1993,1999,2005) for nuanced analyses of the various aspects of Thailand's development experience 
and Jomo(2007,1995)  for Malaysia.. 
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Synthesizing the Experiences of the high growth Asian economies and the Korean economy in 
particular further reveals some common strategic orientations as well as the effects of changes in 
external environment and shifts in policies over time. This is consistent with the characteristics 
of complex economic systems which are nonlinear with multiple equilibria and path dependence. 
Over time, one may observe the emergence of structural shifts in some cases, stagnation in other 
cases depending on initial conditions, strategies, policies and external environment among other 
things.In the Asian cases discussed here, there are many specific variations within each. 
However, they also share to various degrees many specific features listed below. 
 
1. Strategic Openness of the Korean strategy: 
One imp[ortnat feature of the Korean strategy was a strategic commitment to export promotion 
beyond an earlier period of strategic import substitution(SISI)6 and further goals of moving up 
the value added ladder. It should be kept in mind however, that there can be a "fallacy of 
composition"(Cline1982, Khan 1983,Mayer 2002, Razmi and Blecker 2006) in claiming that all 
developing countries need to do is to pursue an export-led growth policy. Reciprocal demands 
may not exist sufficiently and the ensuing competition for export markets in developed countries 
may create winners as well as losers. Therefore, what may be needed in the future for other 
aspiring countries is a strategic approach including the development of national and regional 
markets and the creation of dynamic comparative advantage along with a number of other 
policies and institution building processes described below.In Asia Korea and other East Asian 
successful countries can play a significant enabling role in this respect in the future. 
2. Heterodox macroeconomic policies for stability7---Here  Korea has   displayed more of a mix 
of heterodox policies than the standard Washington consensus. For a long time capital markets 
were not liberalized. Trade policy, on the other hand, was more liberal; but here. Too, it was 
combined with industrial policies(Chang 2007) It seems that the rigidity  of Washington 
consensus particularly in this area is rejected by the experiences of developing economies like 
Korea.  
                                                                                                                    
6 On what I have called SISI, see Amsden(2008) and the references therein, 
Bruton(1998)Khan(2004a,b;1997,1985,1982a,b)  
  
7 See Jomo and Nagaraj(2001) for a good discussion of heterodoxy in this context. 
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3. Creation of institutions for productive investment--- Korea seems to have gone much further 
than even the other successful East Asian countries much earlier.Starting with the reforms in the 
1960s, it moved through several successive stages and is now trying to find appropriate 
technological niche in a world that is moving towards a convergence of information, bio and 
nano technologies by 2050. The role of state in the creation of these institutions is still very 
prominent. 
4. Agricultural development---  Korea and Taiwan had an egalitarian land reform after the end of 
Japanese colonialism. Although, the agricultural policies underwent some swings in Korea, until 
the WTO regime an emphasis on helping the small farmers was quite notable. Technological 
change in agriculture in both Korea and Taiwan has been notable. 
 
 
5. Industrial development and structural change-- the strategic perspective in this important area 
suggests that the successful countries to various degrees pursued a continuously unfolding and 
dynamic set of policies with much trial and error. The retrospective attempts to tell a coherent 
story have often led to an overly deductive picture where good performances supposedly follow 
from a few , usually neoclassical economic principles. The Korean  case studies by Amsden and 
Khan show the comp-lexity of the challenges and the trial and error responses by the policy 
makers over several decades. Amsden(1989, 2008), Khan(1982a,b;1983,1997,2004a,b) and 
Wade(1990) discuss the cases of Korea and Taiwan in the general East Asian context. 
 
6. Creation of technological capabilities--- here the Korean case stands out as a very apt 
illustration of creating technological capabilities throughout the entire growth and development 
trajectory in definite stages.8  
 As Lee(2008,pp.4-5) points out: 
 
Among various aspects of capacities, emphasis should be on technological capabilities because without 
these, sustained growth is impossible. In this era of open market competition, private companies cannot 
sustain growth if they rely upon cheap products; they need to be able to move up the value-chain to 
                                                                                                                    
8 See also Lee(2006) for a contrast of Korean experience with the Washington consensus and  Khan(2008, 
2002,1998 and 1997) for a discussion of the Korean  ( and Taiwanese)case(s) in the context of a distributionally 
sensitive growth model for positive feedback loop innovation system(POLIS).  
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higher-value added goods based on continued upgrading and improvement and technological innovation. 
Furthermore, private companies had betteU EH ³ORFDO´ FRPSDQLHV, whenever possible, including locally 
controlled JVs, not foreign controlled subsidiaries of the MNCs. MNCs subsidiaries are always moving 
around the world seeking cheaper wages and bigger markets.  Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to 
generate sustained growth in specific localities or countries although they can serve as useful channels for 
knowledge transfer and learning. 
 
7. Technological learning and innovation--- a flexible approach to intellectual property 
rights: creating national innovation systems in particular requires the creation of specific 
institutions and technological learning over time. Ultimately, if development is to continue 
beyond the catching up phase, this may present the most crucial set of policy challenges. Here, 
the paper on Korea by Lee(2008) is an admirable attempt to sum up the lessons. There are 
specific features here to which Lee(2008,p.5) draws our attention. 
Therefore, while the ultimate goal and criterion of development is to raise the capabilities of local private 
companies, the process needs pilot agencies to guide and coordinate the whole process. Such needs exist 
EHFDXVHNH\ UHVRXUFHVDUHVR VFDUFHDQG WKXVKDGEHWWHU«EHPRELOL]HG IRUXVHV LQ VHFWRUVRUSURMHFWV
with greatest externalities. As understood by Gerschenkron, who analyzed the latecomer industrialization 
of Germany and Russia, and identified latecomer agencies, such as large state-owned investment banks to 
drive the process in these countries, it is such agencies that can make up for gaps or lacunae in the country 
that is seeking to industrialize. All the east Asian countries built specific state-agencies that played a role 
of guiding the process of industrialization. In Korea the institutions established in the 1960s under the 
Park regime included the Economic Planning Board to set economic plans; the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to support industrial policy and export; and the Ministry of Finance to finance economic plans.  
 
 Both state and civil society have to play important roles. At an earlier stage, the state necessarily 
plays a  large and activist role . At a later stage, however, the creation of technological capability 
has to rely on a private-public partnership at both the precompetitive and the competitive phases 
of innovation(Khan 1998,2004a, 2010). 
8. Direct Foreign Investment and Foreign A id--- these factors have played a role for Korea. Investment 
from abroad has perhaps been more significant than aid per se. However, internal generation of investible 
funds and public sector support have also played a crucial role. 
 
9. Poverty reduction strategies-- these are a varied set of policies that are necessary in addition to 
growth. Although growth is a very important component of  such a strategic approach to poverty 
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reduction, in all cases specific policies targeting both rural and urban poverty were undertaken. 
7KLVVXJJHVWVDJURZWKSOXV«:HLVVDQG.KDQVWUDWHJ\IRUGHYHORSPHQW 
In addition to the nine sets of factors discussed above, there are also somewhat random, 
hLVWRULFDOO\FRQWLQJHQWIDFWRUV.KDQ¶VFDVHVWXG\RQ.RUHDDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHSUHVHQFHRIVXFK
factors explicitly and reveals historically contingent events ranging from momentous events such 
as wars and revolutions to more usual changes in domestic and international political factors and 
changes in policies that depended on crucial personalities such as that of President Park in Korea 
in the 1960s.  
What follows from the above identification of both the relatively necessary as well as the more 
contingent factors that have played a role is, I think, the need for taking a pragmatic and 
diagnostic approach to the problems of development and industrialization in the 21st century. It is 
necessary to identify distortions. It is also equally necessary to identify market failures and other 
institutional failures. Instead of taking a grand, presumptive approach to development, the role of 
a mix of heterodox policies with the willingness to revise policies before the cost gets too high 
seems to be the best recipe for avoiding failures. This has been the Korean experience including 
its response to the disastrous Asian Financial Crisis which in the Korean case was significantly 
affected by hasty financial market liberalization inter alia.  
 
In looking at institution building in the Korean case, it is also clear that generally, it is easier to list the 
functions that good institutions perform than it is to describe the shape they should take. In fact, 
consistent with the complexity approach outlined here, there may be a wide variety of institutions serving 
roughly the same function. From the Korean case, it is apparent that the desirable institutions provide a 
rough and ready type of security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and 
strategically conceived integration with the world economy. In addition, they also help maintain 
macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance. Over time and given 
sufficient financial development, the state and private sector institutions should be able to manage risk-
taking by financial intermediaries. In order to promote equitable growth there will also need to be 
institutions that can supply social insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and 
accountability. But there is no one-size-that-fits-all for any of these functions.9 
 
                                                                                                                    
9 See Chang (2007) for a number of thoughtful contributions on this topic among other things. 
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To sum up, the Korean case offers a set of concrete examples of the growth and development experiences 
during the post WWII period. Although no country can succeed by following mechanically the experience 
of another country , as outlined above, a number of helpful policy and institutional insights can still be 
drawn out from these cases. In the spirit of experimentation with rapid feedback and flexible policy 
making informed by a strategic medium to  long run perspective, much can be done by the policy makers 
who are imaginative and pragmatic at the same time. Dynamic learning and flexible institution building 
are essential components of such a strategic approach to development. I now discuss the somewhat 
changed economic environment in the post cold war period and outline the need for some specific 
changes which Korea and other East Asian economies as well as BRICS can help bring about . This, in 
addition, to the lessons outlined above cDQEHWKHPRVWRSWLPDOZD\IRU.RUHDWRKHOSWRGD\¶VVWUXJJOLQJ
developing economies. Many of the MENA economies and Egypt in particular fall under this category. 
What has been done and what can be done in this region for the kind of strategic integration that can lead 
to rapid capabilities enhancement, particularly for women? 
. 
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Part I I I : The M E N A Region and Egypt : The Political Economy of Capabilities in Action 
The Arab Human development reports date back to 2002. The Regional Bureau for Arab States 
(RBAS) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has pioneered the efforts in the 
Arab region since 2002 to address the development challenges in the region. The Arab Human 
'HYHORSPHQW5HSRUWV $+'5DUH LQWHQGHG WR ³«IRVWHU DEURDG LQIRUPHGGLscussion on the 
NH\TXHVWLRQVIDFLQJVWDNHKROGHUVLQWKHSXUVXLWRIKXPDQGHYHORSPHQWWRLWVIXOOSRWHQWLDO´ 
  
7KHLQWHQWLRQVDVXVXDODUHJRRG%XW LW LVQRWFOHDUWKDW³«WKHVHUHSRUWVDUHDEUHDNWKURXJK´
They need to go much further in unveiling the root causes, particularly the political causes of 
XQGHUGHYHORSPHQW ,W LV XQGRXEWHGO\ SRVLWLYH WR HPSKDVL]H  ³«LQFUHDVHG DFFHVV WR HGXFDWLRQ
and knowledge, full enjoyment of freedom as the cornerstone of good governance, empowerment 
of women, and the guaranWHHRIKXPDQVHFXULW\IRUDOO´+RZHYHU,ZRXOGDUJXHWKDWWRUHDOL]H
these goals, the political move towards ever deeper forms of democracy are essential. Here 
indeed the particular type of capabilities analysis advocated in this paper can clarify a number of 
issues. The Egyptian case study is designed to serve precisely this purpose. 
  
7KH81UHSRUWFRUUHFWO\SRLQWVRXW³«WKHZLGHUDQJHRIFKDOOHQJHVIDFLQJ$UDE\RXWKDV WKH\
transition into adulthood. According to the 2009 edition of the AHDR, Challenges to Human 
Security in the Arab Countries, about 30 percent of the youth in the Arab States region is 
unemployed. Considering that more than 50 percent of the population in Arab countries is under 
the age of 24, 51 million new jobs are needed by 2020 in order to avoid an increase in the 
XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH´7KH(J\SWLDQFDVH VWXG\RIIHUVDGHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQDQGDQDO\VLVRI WKH
youth employment problem from a social capabilities perspective. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in MENA 
needs to include the following areas for achieving capabilities enhancement(i) Macroeconomic 
framework component: Analysis of the evolution and nature of macroeconomic policies and 
their inter-relationships with trade, finance and other policy areas and their effects on MDGs and 
human development. Here, the discussion of Egypt will show that the existing policies have 
limited effects at best and if followed dogmatically can be counterproductive. 
 (ii) F iscal component, the effects of trade reform and policies on the fiscal position of the 
FRXQWULHVDQGLWVUHODWLRQZLWK0'*¶VH[SHQGLWXUHV¶QHHGVDQGSRWHQWLDOFRQVWUDLQLQJHIIHFWRQ
the application of flanking policies. Here, the Egyptian case study below is quite instructive. Not 
only does the neoliberal position embraced by Egypt constrain the government, it actually forces 
it to systematically inflict capabilities damage on vulnerable groups and women. 
 (iii) Institutional component: assessing institutional capacity and performance of trade and 
finance-related institutions in particular and their effect on economic, social and political 
outcomes. In Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and other MENA economies the changes are slow and 
halting. In the two latter cases, at least the process has so far kept dissent within bounds. But 
(J\SW¶V DXWKRULWDULDQ UXOHUVPDGHD UHYROXWLRQDU\ XSULVLQJ WKHRQO\ZD\ WR VWDUW WKHQHFHVVDU\
process of institutional changes for possible capabilities enhancement for all. 
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 (iv) Dynamic effects component, undertaking specific studies to assess spillovers and 
externalities brought about trade and investment policies. Here the evidence so far is mixed. 
Unlike East Asia, where the dynamics has been largely benign and capabilities enhancing, in the 
MENA region the dynamics of worsening inequalities and uneven development signal crises. In 
Egypt and several other MENA countries, this reached the boiling point. But the others, sadly, 
are not far behind in this adverse dynamics.  
 (v) Intellectual property rights component assessing the effects of more stringent protection of 
IPRs on MDGs and human development indicators. Here the contrast with the East Asian 
economies is clear. In these economics, a favorable learning climate was set up without rigid 
Intellectual property rights rules. The current neoliberal regime of TRIPs is a one-size-fits-all 
approach that is not serving countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt or Jordan well. A flexible 
approach is necessary. 
 
A final remark about the need for an integrated and capabilities relevant data framework is 
necessary. Quite often development aid agencies, NGOs and private consultants refer to 
anecdotal evidence to imply that the skeptical view is not warranted. Surely, there are partial 
success stories almost everywhere and there is much to be learned from these. While such 
success stories are important, the piece-meal nature of such accounting is not to be brushed 
aside. These stories do not add up to a coherent strategy, or a consistent information base on 
which a strategy can be formulated and implemented. For economy and society wide strategy we 
need to first conceptually link the specific policies with particular aspects of capabilities analysis 
and attack specific nodal points. An example is the issue of reproductive health of young 
women---particularly those from lower socio-economic strata--- in MENA economies. For a 
relevant capabilities analysis the health issue must be linked with the socio-economic status of 
these women. More specifically, the challenges of poverty, social exclusion and other 
LQWHUUHODWHGGLVFULPLQDWRU\LGHDVDQGSUDFWLFHVDJDLQVWZRPHQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHVHQKDQFHPHQWVPXVW
be identified and attacked coherently. A second requirement for formulating quantitative goals 
and targets and an implementation program is to create a consistent information base that 
initially  relates to crucial aspects of capabilities of specific groups of individuals and ultimately 
to each specific person in the group.A detailed social accounting matrix(SAM) that integrates a 
demographic information base with socio-economic  data for the MENA countries will be a 
good start in this direction. 
 
. 
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Looking at the MENA region as a whole it is clear that from the wealthy Emirates to the poorer 
countries there is  wide variation in human development. This is captured partially and 
imperfectly in the HDI scores which range widely. But even the highest scoring countries are 
still far behind many other developing countries with much lower per capita income. I present 
the Egyptian case study below to explore the problems of human development in a not-so-rich 
Arab state. Egypt is the largest of the MENA countries in terms of population and also has great 
historical importance in regional politics. Given the social and political capabilities approach 
outlined in part I, the recent political upheavals offering  potential democratization in Egypt 
make this case particularly significant . 
  
The Egyptian Case Study  
We begin by looking at the trend in HDI. As pointed  out at the outset, the HDI---even with 
many adjustments---captures only a few dimensions of capabilities. But even with these rather 
limited scope, the index does capture some well-being aspects beyond economic growth. Egypt 
has certainly made progress since 1980 when it had an HDI of only .393 which was below the 
Arab average. This latter, in turn, was below the world average in 1980.Over the last three 
decades, the Egyptian HDI gradually overtook the Arab HDI average. But both still lag behind 
the world average which was .624 in 2010. Looking at the rates of change of HDI in Egypt, 
progress slowed down in the first decade of the twentieth century. Egypt is still ranked 101 
among all countries. 
Table 1: Human Development Index Egypt: T rends 1980-2010 
 
  
Rank 101 
Year Egypt A rab States World 
1980 0.393   0.398  0.455  
1985 n.a.   0.442  0.486  
1990 0.484   0.477  0.526  
1995 n.a.   0.509  0.554  
2000 0.566   0.530  0.570  
2001 n.a.   0.536  0.575  
2002 n.a.   0.545  0.581  
2003 n.a.   0.549  0.587  
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2004 n.a.   0.556  0.594  
2005 0.587   0.563  0.598  
2006 0.594   0.570  0.604  
2007 0.601   0.576  0.611  
2008 0.608   0.580  0.615  
2009 0.614   0.585  0.619  
2010 0.620   0.590  0.624  
 
 
 %XWZHQHHGWRORRNDWVRPHPRUHH[WHQVLYHGDWDIRUDVVHVVLQJ(J\SW¶VSHUIRUPDQFHUHFHQWO\
Table 2 offers some indicators on health,education, income inequality, poverty, human security, 
gender inequality etc. It is clear from table 2 that both income inequality and gender inequality 
remain quite high in Egypt. Consequently, the inequality adjusted HDI is only .449 or about two-
thirds of the unadjusted HDI for 2010. The indicators ranging from those on womens education 
DQGPDWHUQDOKHDOWKWRZRPHQ¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQVKRZZLGHVSUHDGJHQGHUGLVSDULWLHV
Although national level data are not officially available, my fieldwork and interviews with 
Egyptian researchers also revealed great rural deprivation and for both rural urban areas the 
suffering of the lower socioeconomic groups. Everywhere women from these groups face more 
discrimination and barriers to capabilities enhancements. Thus the approach of social 
institutional  network based approach to capabilities adopted here seems relevant.In light of this 
approach it is relevant to ask if some institutional and policy changes in the last ten years can 
explain the slowdown in general capabilities enhancement and the deplorable gender disparities 
which persist in spite of much development rhetoric to the contrary. The answer is that by the 
year 2000, a set of neoliberal policies in trade, finance, fiscal and monetary policy areas came to 
EHILUPO\LQSODFH7KLVGHFDGHDOVRVDZDVFOHURVLVLQ(J\SW¶VSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
XQGHU0REDUDN¶VUHJLPH,QRZWXUQWRWKHVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV 
 
 
 
Table 2: Other well-being indicators for Egypt ---2010 
Health  
Life expectancy at birth (years) 70.5  
Indicator Value  Prevalence of undernourishment in total population (% of population) <5    
Expenditure on health, public (% of GDP)  2.4    
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) 23    
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Life expectancy at birth (years) 70.5    
Education  
Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years) 6.5  
Indicator Value  Adult literacy rate (both sexes) (% aged 15 and above) 66.4       
Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (both sexes) (%) 76.4       
Expenditure on education (% of GDP) (%) 3.8    
Internet users (per100 people) 16.6    
Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years) 6.5    
Expected Years of schooling (of children) (years) 11.0       
Income  
GNI per capita (2008 PPP US$) LN  8.7  
Indicator Value  GDP per capita (2008 PPP US$) 5,840      
GNI per capita (2008 PPP US$) LN  8.7    
Household final consumption expenditure per capita PPP (constant 2005 
international $)  2,608    
Inequality  
Inequality-adjusted HDI value  0.449  
Indicator Value  Income Gini coefficient  32.1    
Inequality-adjusted education index  0.304      
Inequality-adjusted income index  0.465       
Inequality-adjusted HDI value  0.449    
Inequality-adjusted life expectancy  n.a.    
Poverty  
Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3)  0.026  
Indicator Value  Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3)  0.026      
Intensity of deprivation  40.4    
MPI: Headcount ( k greater than or equal to 3), population in poverty (% of 
population) 6.4  
    
Population living below $1.25 PPP per day (%) <2    
Gender  
Gender Inequality Index, value  0.714  
Indicator Value  Maternal mortality ratio (deaths of women per100,000 live births) 130      
Population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio  0.710    
Adolescent fertility rate (women aged 15-19 years) (births per 1,000 women aged 
15-19) 39.0    
Labour force participation rate, female/male ratio (Ratio of female to male shares) n.a.    
Gender Inequality Index, value  0.714      
Shares in parliament, female-male ratio  0.038    
Maternal mortality ratio (new estimates) (deaths of women per100,000 live births) 82    
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Gender Inequality Index (updated)  0.693    
Sustainability  
Adjusted net savings (% of GNI) 2.1  
Indicator Value  Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (tonnes) 2.2    
Protected area (percentage of terrestrial area) 5.9    
Adjusted net savings (% of GNI) 2.1    
Human Security  
Refugees (thousands) 6.8  
Indicator Value  Refugees (thousands) 6.8    
Unemployment rate, total (%) (% of labour force) 8.7    
Homicide rate (per 100,000) 0.8      
Robbery rate (per 100,000) 1    
Population affected by natural disasters (average per year, per million) (average per 
year per million people) 2  
    
Composite indices  
HDI value  0.620  
Indicator Value  Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3)  0.026     
HDI value  0.620    
Gender Inequality Index, value  0.714   Inequality-adjusted HDI value  0.449    
 
 
 
The Neoliberal Approach to T rade and Development in Egypt since 2000 and Its 
Implications: 
 
 
Egypt embarked on major economic structural reforms since 1991 after entering in an economic 
reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) designed and implemented jointly with the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)10. Throughout most of the 1990s, Egypt 
succeeded in implementing a reform program which managed to slow down inflation and make progress 
in restoring internal balances where the macroeconomic indicators improved over the period 1991-1998 . 
Since 1991 the Government of Egypt (GoE) adopted a number of neoliberal reform measures which 
included devaluation of the Egyptian pound and unification of the existing exchange rate systems, 
reduction of trade barriers, initiation of an ambitious privatization program (though it slowed down in the 
                                                                                                                    
10 ERSAP was not the first imitative by the Egyptian government to undertake reforms. In fact, Egypt signed three 
standby agreements with the IMF in 1976, 1978, and 1987. These entire standby agreements followed the same line 
of policy recommendations, advocating to different degrees tight fiscal and monetary policies, liberal exchange rate 
and trade policies along neo-classical lines.  However, with the exception of the ERSAP, the other three agreements 
were discontinued for social, political or economic reasons (Korayem, 1997). 
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latter part of that decade), adoption of a tightened fiscal policy, reduction of subsidies on some strategic 
commodities including gasoline, and upgrading and expanding physical infrastructure. 
 
In terms of GDP and external balance, the economic performance improved slightly over the 
1990s  (with the exception of 1997/98 when real GDP growth rate dropped significantly mainly 
due to Luxor massacre and its severe impact on the tourism, one of the main pillars of the 
Egyptian economy, and the capital flight which followed the 1997 Asian financial crisis). For 
example, the budget deficit dropped from 20% of GDP in the early 1990s to 1.3% towards the 
end the decade; and average annual inflation declined from 22.2% in 1990 to 2.8% in 2000. Real 
GDP growth rate increased from 2.1% in 1991 to 5.4% in 2000; and private sector share in GDP 
rose from 64.3% in 1994/1995 to 70.4% in 1999/2000.  In fact, Egypt has been appraised for its 
success in the implementation of the program as the reports of international organizations have 
revealed11 (see for example, IMF, 1998). The ERSAP contained a trade policy12 component and 
several important steps were taken by the government starting 1991 in this regard. However, and 
despite relatively competitive labor costs, labor intensive production remained below potential, 
ZKLOHPHUFKDQGLVHH[SRUWVZHUHOLPLWHGDQGQDUURZO\IRFXVHG´,0)S 
 
2000 onwards 
Even these macroeconomic trends were reversed in 2000/01 as a result of the stagnation of the political 
process, and further aggravated by a slowdown in the international economy and the impact of September 
11th terrorism attack. The negative developments were further exacerbated by the appreciation of the 
Egyptian pound, which was pegged to the US dollar. In effect, the government experienced substantial 
official reserve losses where it dropped down from US$16.8 billion in early 1997 to US$14.2 billion in 
2001. The corrective actions undertaken by the government to tighten monetary policy in 1999/2000 
resulted in the decrease in private credit. As a result of such repercussion, real GDP growth rate declined 
from 7.5% in 1998 to 3.5% in 2001. Real GDP growth continued to fall and reached its lowest level in a 
decade in 2003 (3.1%) whereas budget deficit reached reversed upwards to 9.6% of GDP in 2004/05. This 
deficit remained high later, yet slightly decreased in 2005/2006, reaching 8.2%. 
Alarmed by the slowdown of the economy and the negative economic indicators, the GOE sought to 
revive the neoliberal economic reform program. A wide ranging set of economic reforms have been 
undertaken after the appointment of a new cabinet in 2004. Among the reforms undertaken were the 
floatation of Egyptian pound which in fact preceded the appointment of the new cabinet and took place in 
early 2003, trade and customs reform, tax reform and a more market-oriented macroeconomic policy. For 
example, corporate and personal tax rates were cut by half, many tax loopholes were eliminated, and tax 
administration was improved, which resulted in a substantial increase of tax receipts (corporate, wages, 
and goods) when compared to pre-tax reform. The GOE introduced a reform program for the financial 
                                                                                                                    
11 $VKDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG³%\WKHVWDQGDUGVRIUHFHQWH[SHULHQFHZLWKHFRQRPLF
staELOL]DWLRQ(J\SWLQWKHVLVDUHPDUNDEOHVXFFHVVVWRU\´,0)S 
12 By trade policy we mean tariff and non tariff measures, subsidies, surcharges, and taxes. We do not deal with 
macroeconomic issues as exchange rate. 
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sector in 2005 lasting till 2008 and started to privatize state-owned banks and improved the prudential 
regulations governing the financial sector. In other words, the cabinet appointed in July 2004 undertook 
an ambitious program of economic modernization following Washington Consensus type of reforms 
though without direct pressures from World Bank and IMF.  
 
Privatization program was revived after a period of slow down which lasted between 1997 till 2003. 
According to the Ministry of Investment, 8 public companies were sold in the period from July 2004 till 
July 2008, amounting to a sales proceeds total of LE 1.2 billion; in addition, 22 public assets and 
production lines were sold for LE 2.4 billion in the same period. One major landmark of the program was 
WKH VHOOLQJ RI%DQN RI$OH[DQGULD RQH RI (J\SW¶V IRXU VWDWH-owned banks, which took place in 2006, 
yielding a sale proceeds total of LE 9.2 billion. The results of implementing the program starting from 
1991, however, yielded as of July 2008 more than LE 58 billion in revenues from total and partial sales 
through 401 transactions, besides the optional early retirement of more than 205,000 workers, and the 
comprehensive debt settlement agreement currently being finalized between the Ministry of Investment, 
Ministry of Finance and creditor banks for the debt owed by remaining companies (under law 203) 
amounting to LE 9.7 billion (as of June 2007).  
 
The reforms undertaken by the 2004 Cabinet resorted the macroeconomic imbalances but only at the 
expense of almost completely liquidating public services and public enterprises.. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows increased temporarily from $0.2 billion in 2003 to $11.5 billion in 2007 
(UNCTAD WIR 2008).  However, the reforms undertaken focused mainly on economic policies whereas 
institutional and social dimensions remained lagging. The inflation rate skyrocketed reaching 18% in 
2008 (CBE) while increase in nominal wages lagged behind. In addition,even officia unemployment l 
figures remain high revolving around 11.7% in 2007/2008 (Ministry of Finance, 2008) (non-official 
sources give double this amount), whereas under-employment and reliance on the informal economy 
(often estimated at one third to one half the size of official GDP) are heavy relied on as an informal social 
safety net. Income inequality remained almost stagnant with Gini coefficient reaching 34 percent in 2004 
compared to 33 in 1995 (World Bank, online database). Moreover, other crucial institutional pillars of a 
prudent market economy were  introduced much later including the competition law in 2005 and 
consumer protection law in 2006. 
 
It is in these contexts of shortsighted neoliberalism and political repression in Egypt that the revolution in 
Egypt that began recently with the demonstrations in Tahrir square and overthrew the Mobarak regime 
has to be viewed. The Egyptian people---the youth in particular--- has revolted inter alia against 
capabilities depravation. The role of political capabilities here is paramount. But social and economic 
aspects of capabilities are also at work. I now turn to a discussion of these intermixed political, economic 
and social capabilities involved in the still unfinished and perhaps inchoate revolution. 
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Egypt: the Unfinished Revolution for Capabilities Enhancement 
The revolutions in Egypt and across the Middle East are far from over, and many are still 
violently embroiled in their national battles for political freedom. It  would be shallow and cynical to 
think that revolutions  are simply  phenomena that belong to 2011, for the impact of the political 
upheavals and newfound social empowerments for Middle Eastern populations is already too deep to be 
so short-lived. Consistent with our theory, a more reasonable way to look at these phenomena  is to 
realize that these revolutions are demarcating the end of the era of entrenched corruption of cronyism in 
politics, economics and society at large. These are, at the very least, only the beginning of a new, youthful 
generation of social movements that will demand more responsible and accountable governance regimes 
and social and economic justice.  
Demands for economic justice  represent strong undercurrents for economic change, in addition 
to the necessity for political change, reflect the complex class dimensions which superficial analysis can 
easily miss. The youth, in particular, raised slogans demanding a remodeling of their economies to fit 
their needs, creating more public sector jobs and thus reducing the high levels of youth unemployment in 
the region.Many of the young people in Tahrir square came from the working classes or newly arrived 
peasant families in Cairo. OtheUVPD\EHIURP³PLGGOH´FODVVEXW IDFLQJFRQWLQXLQJYXOQHUDELOLWLHVLQD
neoliberal economy. Although it will be too economistic to see a direct link between the global crisis and 
the Egyptian uprising, the neoliberal reforms of the Mubarak years contributed to serious poverty, 
deprivation and vulnerability. 
  
Since the global economic recession in 2008, the world overall has seen a rise in unemployment and in 
Egypt,as in many developing countries, there has been high youth unemployment. The previous adoption 
RIQHROLEHUDOSROLFLHVOHGGLUHFWO\WRWKH(J\SWLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VIDLOXUHWRFUHDWHDGHTXDWHSXEOLFVHFWRU
jobs. Consequently, Egypt has seen: underemployment of youth in low-wage private sector jobs, 
persistent inequality for women in the workforce, and degradation of human capital as more education 
does not necessarily lead to a better job, or any job at all in many cases. These trends have been captured 
E\WKH81'3¶V+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW5HSRUWIRU(J\SWLQYouth in Egypt, Building Our Future.13 
  
Measuring Youth Capabilities and F reedoms in Egypt 
The trends in youth unemployment are described by categorizing the younger generation of 
Egyptians at ages 18²ZKLFKWKH81'3FDOOVWKH³FULWLFDODJHJURXS´14 This group represents about 
one-quarter of EJ\SW¶V SRSXODWLRQ²20 million people²and face near-future decisions that will define 
them as heads of households, community members, employees in the marketplace, and citizens and 
HPSOR\HHV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW 7KH DELOLW\ RI (J\SW¶V \RXWK WR PDNH WKRVH GHFLVions freely and with 
                                                                                                                    
13 UNDP. Youth in Egypt, Building Our Future. United Nations Development Programme. 
http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf  
14 3UHDPEOHS;,,ELG³7KHGHILQLWLRQDFFRPPRGDWHVIRUWKHORZer age limit of 18 years adopted by Egyptian law 
as the transition from childhood to adulthood as well as the upper age limit of 29 years when society and most youth 
WKHPVHOYHVH[SHFWDQGKRSHWRKDYHIRUPHGDIDPLO\DQGDFTXLUHGDKRXVH´ 
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dignity will affect the welfare of the nation as a whole, and thus the UNDP has also created a Youth Well-
Being Index (YWBI) for Egypt to better indicate the needs of the youth and enable better government 
response to such needs.15  
 The inability of the government to respond thus far to the needs of the Egyptian youth has meant 
a great deal of sacrifice from these members of society. Disabled from fully entering the economy due to 
a national lack of opportunities, many of the young college graduates in Egypt are forced to move back 
LQWR WKHLU IDPLOLHV¶ KRPHV DQG WDNH OHVVHU-quality jobs. This in turn, has spurred a serious trend of 
underemployment in Egypt. Suffering from longer periods of unemployment, often youth become 
discouraged and develop unproductive dependencies on the family and state.16 Disappointed youth lack 
the emancipation and empowerment that are essential to adulthood and egalitarian democratic practices; 
thus, Egyptian youth have been increasingly disenfranchised from social, economic, and political 
participation. In this way, it is seen why youth have become the necessary leaders of the Egyptian 
revolution in 2011, as they have been forced to claw-back their civic freedoms and personal liberties that 
are necessary for them to establish their adult livelihoods.Quite simply, the reason for the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution was that the youth population could not wait for freedom any longer. Since 1998, there has 
been a strong trend of unemployment for those with university degrees in Egypt, a problem that is 
exacerbated along gender lines. The fact of the matter for many of those young adults is that from 1998²
2010 they were not so young anymore and that there was even a generational component to youth 
unemployment.17 Social pressures to start families weigh heaviest on those young adults who are not so 
young anymore, and thus their anxieties to change the political and economic systems that were holding 
them back from pursuing their adulthood became so immense that there was revolution.  
The UNDP report found that Egyptian youth aspire to higher education, adequate employment, 
and community engagement. This translates to values for political voice, marriage, and family. These are 
not complicated values, but are simple representations of human needs, and thus should be understood 
easily by policy makers. The necessary measures to address these human needs require no more than an 
open government that can cohesively set national planning standards which share these values as a part of 
a broader initiative to account for the youth population bulge, wherein 40% of all Egyptians are aged 
10²29.18 
  
 Prior to the economic crisis in 2008, Egypt had witnessed a respectable rate of growth in GDP, 
with GDP growth rates scaling upwards from 1.70% in 2003 to 7.10% in 2008. Following the impact of 
the global recession, GDP growth rates decreased by 36.11%, so that by 2010, the GDP growth rate had 
dropped to 4.60%.19 There is a strong correlation of GDP growth within Egypt to that of the developed 
world, highlighting the favorable terms of trade, rapid growth of external demand, and abundant 
                                                                                                                    
15 See Chapter 15, pp. 205²218. Ibid.   
16 Introduction, p. VII, Ibid.  
17 7KLVLVPRVWHYLGHQWLQWKHSRRUHVWUXUDOFRPPXQLWLHV6HH³([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\´Youth in Egypt, Building Our 
Future. United Nations Development Programme. 
http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf  
18 Forward, p. IX, Ibid.  
19 &,$:RUOG)DFWERRN³(J\SW´https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html  
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international liquidity.20 This dependent relationship between Egypt and the developed world resulted in 
LQFUHDVLQJWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\RI(J\SW¶VRZQHFRQRP\WRWKHUeal shocks of the global economic recession 
in 2008.  
These real shocks were manifested as drops in tourism revenues, volatile oil prices, spikes in food 
prices, and shifts in foreign direct investment that have led to economic growth to shrink and 
unemployment to rise in the nation.21 7RXULVPDQGVHUYLFHVLQGXVWULHVUHSUHVHQWRI(J\SW¶VIRUHLJQ
exchange earnings, especially as the earnings from the Suez Canal dropped significantly due to the overall 
reduction of world trade following the economic crisis of 2008.22 Volatile oil prices in the Middle East 
have negatively impacted Egypt, as it primarily imports its food to urban areas, where populations and 
markets are most concentrated. The global economic crisis undoubtedly impacted global food prices as 
well, which spiked to an all-time high in 2008.23 As increased inflation and commodity prices ensued in 
2008, many Egyptian families could not afford to keep up even their existing  standards of living, and 
many Egyptian youth were forced to move home to their families to wait-RXWNQRZQDV³ZDLW-KRRG´WKH
harsh economic climate at the time. 
Unfortunately, as revealed by the UNDP 2010 report for Egypt, youth unemployment was not 
abated over time, but worsened. The initial spike in unemployment following the economic crisis in 2008 
was exacerbated by the economic recession that lasted through 2010.24 The persistence of the youth 
unemployment trend in Egypt reveals failures in the educational system, and labor and housing markets. 
³:DLW-KRRG´LVQRZWKHQH[WVWHSping stone for young adults between their adolescence and adulthood, 
and the impacts of such an awkward stage for youth are driving social change. The internal frustration of 
the youth population in Egypt has been become unmistakably externalized in the demonstrations for 
political change in recent years, culminating an array of youth-led social movements.  
The implications of the growing trend of youth leadership for civic activism became manifested 
in the overthrow President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. What remains to be examined now is how 
the various youth-led social groups can retain their newfound legitimacy in the coming months (and 
years) that Egypt will struggle to reconstruct itself as an open democracy. The following section describes 
the most important actors in the network of social activist groups with a view towards underlining the 
                                                                                                                    
20 World Bank. Arab Republic of Egypt: Egypt and the Global Economic Crisis: A Preliminary Assessment of 
Macroeconomic Impact and Response.. Social and Economic Development Group, Middle East and North Africa 
5HJLRQ9RO,RI,,0DLQ5HSRUW-XQH³([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\´SS 
21 Dhillon, Navtej and Assaad, Ragui. Food, Fuel, and F inance: How Will the Middle East Weather the Global 
Economic Crisis? 6HULHVRI2FW³(J\SWLDQ(FRQRP\3URWHFWHGRU([SRVHG"´0LGGOH(DVW<RXWK
Initiative. The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC.  
http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2008/1029_egypt_dhillon.aspx  
22 Ibid.  
23 Holt-GiPHQH](ULF³7KH:RUOG)RRG&ULVLV:KDW¶VEHKLQGLWDQGZKDWZHFDQGRDERXWLW´3ROLF\%ULHIQR
)RRG)LUVW,QVWLWXWHIRU)RRGDQG'HYHORSPHQW3ROLF\2DNODQG&$2FWREHU³7KH:RUOG%DQNUHSRUWHGWKDW
global prices had rose over 83% in the last three years (2005²2008), and the FAO cited a 45% increase in their 
ZRUOGIRRGSULFHLQGH[LQOHVVWKDQD\HDU7KH(FRQRPLVWPDJD]LQH¶VIRRGSULFHLQGH[LVDWLWVKLJKHVWPDUNLQWKH
KLVWRU\RIWKHSXEOLFDWLRQVLQFH´ 
24 See Chapter 3, Youth in Egypt, Building Our Future. United Nations Development Programme. pp. 35²42. 
http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf  
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need for an egalitarian democratic solution for Egypt and by implication for the other Middle Eastern 
political economies. 
The unorthodox and inchoate revolution and the future 
These social movements for political change in Egypt were organized in an unorthodox and in fact, 
revolutionary manner. The ability of the organizers of the Egyptian revolution to use the politically 
hitherto untapped powers of the internet to connect their diverse array of potential participants in Egypt 
and beyond proved to be the cutting-edge tool that gave them the advantage over past social and political 
DFWLYLVP WDFWLFV (J\SW¶V PRVW UHFHQW SROLWLFDO XSKHDYDO KDV EHHQ FDOOHG µ5HYROXWLRQ ¶ GXH WR WKH
impacts of social media on political activism in Egypt. The face of revolutions today is enigmatic and can 
no longer be categorized by a simple ideology or political party, for those fearless individuals in Egypt 
stood for more than just political change: rather, they stood more broadly for a cultural revolution that 
ZLOOEHJXLGHGE\WKHZRUOG¶VQHZJHQHUDWLRQRIWHFK-savvy, educated youth.At the same time, as already 
discussed, our particular theory of social movements based on deep political and social economic causal 
mechanisms, helps us to see the deeper connections between the youth, the technology, the class 
structure, urbanization, and Egypt;s location as a dependent economy within the global flow of capital, its 
hegemonic structure and the international division of labor. 
.HID\D³(QRXJK´ 
 In Egypt, Kefaya²PHDQLQJ³HQRXJK´²emerged as a transformative group that sought political 
change during the 2004²2005 Egyptian parliamentary and presidential elections, whereby President 
Mubarak placed his son, Gamal, in many important government posts, as well as reelected himself for a 
5th term. The rally on December 12, 2004, historically marked the first occasion of protest since 
0XEDUDN¶VDUULYDOWRWKHSUHVLGHQF\LQDQGZDVIRUPHGE\VRme 1000 activists who gathered on the 
steps of the High Court in Cairo with their mouths taped over with large yellow stickers emblazoned with 
³.HID\D´ 
Kefaya represents more than just a classified social group, but its existence underlies the face of 
chDQJH LQ (J\SW .HID\D¶V XQLTXH HIIRUWV UHDFKHG DFURVV LGHRORJLFDO OLQHV DPRQJ DFWLYLVWV DQG
intellectuals, and introduced a new force for political change that would be the backbone of the future 
(J\SWLDQ 5HYROXWLRQ  LQ WKH HDUO\   7KH PRYHPHQW¶V Panifesto exhorted fellow citizens to 
³ZLWKGUDZ WKHLU ORQJ-DEXVHG FRQVHQW WR EH JRYHUQHG´ DV SURQRXQFHG E\ 7DULT DO-Bishri, a respected 
Egyptian judge in 2004.  This slogan stuck with the people of Egypt, and would be carried forward into 
the April 6th movHPHQWWKDWZRXOGEHFRQFHLYHGLQLQVXSSRUWRIDQLQGXVWULDOZRUNHUV¶VWULNHDQG
would later play a fundamental role in organizing many social groups for political change that 
participated in the January 25th ³'D\RI$QJHU´SURWHVWVWKDWODXQFKHGWKH current Egyptian Revolution .  
.HID\D¶V UHVLOLHQF\FRQWLQXHGDJDLQVW WKH0XEDUDN UHJLPHDQG LWV SROLFH IRUFHGHVSLWHSROLWLFDO
and practical challenges. Many of the Kefaya members were attacked by police on May 25th, 2005, but 
this did not stop many more from holding regular protests every Wednesday for the rest of the summer of 
2005. In addition, Kefaya organized a candlelight vigil on June 8th, 2005 at the mausoleum of Saad 
Zaghloul, a national hero of Egypt. Some 2,000 people flooded the evening with light and hope, 
demonstrating the collective call for political change in Egypt. On the eve of the presidential elections, in 
which Mubarak would seek to gain his 5th term, 200 Kefaya demonstrators were attacked violently by 
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police forces. The atrocity caughWWKHDWWHQWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFKDQGZDVGHVFULEHGDVDQDFW³QRW
MXVWWRSUHYHQWDGHPRQVWUDWLRQEXWDOVRWRSK\VLFDOO\SXQLVKWKRVHGDULQJWRSURWHVW3UHVLGHQW0XEDUDN¶V
FDQGLGDF\´25 .HID\D¶V UHDFWLRQ WR WKH YLROHQFHZDV WR ER\FRWW WKH HOHFWLRQV Dltogether, pulling out its 
potential candidates from the race.26 ,Q WKHHOHFWLRQV RQO\ VL[PLOOLRQRI(J\SW¶VPLOOLRQSOXV
SRSXODWLRQ YRWHG LQ IDYRU RI 0XEDUDN GHVSLWH 0XEDUDN¶V FODLP WR  RI WKH QDWLRQDO YRWH27 In 
response to the political injustices committed by the Mubarak regime during the elections, Kefaya 
supporters organized its largest rally yet, on September 27, 2005, with 5,000 discouraged voters carrying 
EDQQHUVDQGFKDQWLQJVORJDQVWKDWVDLG³PLOOLRQYRWHG\HVPLOOLRQVD\QR´28 In the autumn of 2005 
.HID\D¶VSROLWLFDOSURVSHFWVQDUURZHG:LWKWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQVSDVWDQGWKH0XEDUDNUHJLPHVWLOO
in power, Kefaya saw yet another opportunity for political change in the parliamentary elections of 
November and December 2005. In a hasty attempt to grab parliamentary seats from the ruling NDP, 
Kefaya joined with the National Front for Change to take 12 seats total. The Muslim Brotherhood, 
although banned from politics in Egypt, was able to take 88 seats as independents. In all, the NDP 
remained dominant with 388 seats. Evaluating the minimal gains for independents in the parliamentary 
HOHFWLRQV  .HID\D DGPLWWHG WKDW ³LW ZLOO WDNH WLPH DQG HIIRUW IRU WKH SXEOLF WR EHOLHYH LQ LWV
HIIHFWLYHQHVV´29 This message would be played out repeatedly for the next seven years until the fateful 
day of January 25th, 2011. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
As the leading opposition party in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood represents more than just 
political strength, but also serves as a social support network for Egyptians. It therefore has a broad base 
of popular support . Mubarak originally outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood due to his paranoid fear that if 
given the chance, they would soon overtake the Egyptian government and make Egypt an Islamic state. 
MubDUDN¶VSDUDQRLDZDVVXFFLQFWO\VXPPDUL]HGLQKLVVWDWHPHQWPDGHWRDQ$PHULFDQQHZVFKDQQHOLQ
)HEUXDU\,
PIHGXS>RIUXOLQJ(J\SW@«%XWLI,UHVLJQQRZWKHUHZLOOEHFKDRV$QG,
PDIUDLG
WKH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGZLOOWDNHRYHU´30 Egyptian membership in the Muslim Brotherhood is estimated 
to be 300,000, but with millions of sympathizers nationally.31 7KH JURXS¶V VWUHQJWK OLHV LQ WKH XUEDQ
PLGGOHFODVVDVPDQ\RI LWVPHPEHUV UHSUHVHQW WKH³FUqPHGH ODFUqPH´RI(J\SWLDQERXUJHRLVLH²the 
movement is led by doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers.32  
'HVSLWH0XEDUDN¶VRYHU-projected phobia of Islamist takeover via the Brotherhood, the Muslim 
Brotherhood represents pragmatic and limited democratic ideals to simply represent the interests and 
                                                                                                                    
25 +5:³(J\SW6HFXrity Forces Attack Oppostion 'HPRQVWUDWRUV´1 Aug 2005.  
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/08/01/egypt-security-forces-attack-opposition-demonstrators  
26 Heba Saleh, Re-Birth of Egyptian Politics, BBC News, 5 September 2005 
27 Fathy, Ahmed & Al Husseini, Hamdy³(J\SW¶V.HID\D+ROGV³6ZHDU-,Q´'HPR´ IslamOnline.Net, 28 
September 2005. http://www.islamonline.org/English/News/2005-09/28/article04.shtml  
28 Ibid.  
29Shehab, 6KDGHQ³7KDW¶V(QRXJK´ Al-Ahram Weekly, 29 December 2005. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/  
30 .KDQ0RKDPPHG³:KR¶VDIUDLGRIWKH0XVOLP%URWKHUV´Al Jazeera. 9 Feb 2011. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/20112810283643766.html  
31 %URRNH6WHYHQ	+DPLG6KDGL³7KH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRG¶V5ROHLn the Egyptian Revolution´CTC Sentinel. 
Vol. 4, Issue 2. February 2011. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss2.pdf  
32.KDQ0RKDPPHG³:KR¶VDIUDLGRIWKH0XVOLP%URWKHUV´Al Jazeera. 9 Feb 2011. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/20112810283643766.html  
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desires of its constituency, which overtime, may be represented in political positions, and have 
implications on foreign policies. But, it is important to note that the Muslim Brotherhood is in a period of 
transition just as is the rest of Egypt during this time of revolution, and thus is vulnerable to adapt to new 
political and social tensions among its constituents. Whether the petty bourgeois and bourgeois can be 
persuaded to move towards and egalitarian anti-imperialist democratic program is the key question. 
In the current revolutionary movement, at first, the Brotherhood did not take an active role, due to 
IHDUV RI DQ RYHUVWDWHG IRUHLJQ DQG GRPHVWLF JRYHUQPHQW PHGLD SRUWUD\DO RI (J\SW¶V UHYROXWLRQ DV DQ
,VODPLFRQHEXWWKH³VOHHSLQJJLDQW´RIWKH%URWKHUKRRGEHFDme awakened once its younger members---
mainly of working class and peasant background--- became more involved in the street protests. The 
0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRG¶V\RXQJHUPHPEHUVJDLQHGUHVSHFWIURPWKHLUHOGHUVZLWKLQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDVWKH\
were able to effectively prod the Brotherhood members into essential organizational roles, without which 
WKHHQGXUDQFHRIWKHUHYROXWLRQPD\KDYHEHHQZHDNHQHG7KH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRG¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH
wishes of its younger generation stands as evidence that the organization has a great potential for 
democratic change than the media pundits proclaim. The young leaders of the Brotherhood are proof that 
the face of politics is changing in Egypt in complex and not easily predictable ways. 
The April 6th Movement 
 In 2008, what is now known as the April 6th Movement broke away from the Kefaya 
movement in an effort to organize a national strike in support of industrial workers. The strike took place 
on April 6th, 2008 in the town of Mahalia al-Kubra, and had developed a highly efficient strategy for 
SURWHVWLQJ PRGHOHG DIWHU ,UDQ¶V *UHHQ PRYHPHQW 7KLV ³PRGXV RSHUDQGL´ FXOOHG IURP WKHLU 3HUVLDQ
compatriots would be fundamental to the Day of Anger protests held on January 25th, 2011, as it gave 
Egyptians a clear description of their demands, strategic goals for civil disobedience, the necessary 
clothing and accessories for protests, as well as strategies for protestors²such as appropriate signs and 
defensive techniques.33 The general demands being made by those involved in the Day of Anger were:  
(1) The downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers; (2) the cessation of the Emergency 
Law; (3) freedom; (4) justice; (5) the formation of a new, non-military government with the interests of 
the Egyptian people at heart; and WKHFRQVWUXFWLYHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIDOORI(J\SW¶VUHVRXUFHV34 These 
demands were propelled by the determined and relentless sprit of the Egyptian people who sought to 
³WDNHWRWKHVWUHHWVDQGNHHSJRLQJXQWLOWKHGHPDQGVRIWKH(J\SWLDQSHRSOHKDYHEHHn met."35 
We are all Khaled Said 
Perhaps the most inspiring story of the Egyptian revolution is that of Khaled Said, a young 
Egyptian who was caught filming a bad drug deal handling by Egyptian police and was beaten to death as 
a consequence. The government tried to cover up the story with claims that Said swallowed and choked 
on his own drugs, but this was exposed as a patent lie as mass-circulated photos on the internet revealed 
chilling images of severe beating on the innocent face of Said. Said became an online martyr instantly, 
gaining more than 500,000 Facebook supporters prior to the protests. The Facebook group members 
                                                                                                                    
33 0DGULJDO$OH[LV³(J\SWLDQ$FWLYLVWV¶$FWLRQ3ODQ7UDQVODWHG´The Atlantic. 27 Jan 2011. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/egyptian-activists-action-plan-translated/70388/  
34 Ibid. 
35 &ODUN(VWHV$GDP³$QDWRP\RIDUHYROXWLRQ0HHWWKH\RXQJ(J\SWLDQDFWLYLVWVZKRVWDUWHGLWDOO´Salon.  10 
Feb 2011. 
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/02/10/egypt_youth_activists_april_6_kefaya_jan25/index.html  
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organized a silent protest whereby the protestors stood five meters apart (as to avert classifications as a 
µUDOO\¶ WKDWZRXOG EH EURNen up by police forces), dressed in black, along the sea wall in Alexandria, 
.KDOHG¶VKRPHWRZQ7KHSURWHVWVVSUHDGWRRWKHU(J\SWLDQFLWLHVLQDZLGHUPRYHPHQWWKDWV\PEROL]HG
the solidarity of Egyptians against the long-standing Emergency Law, promulgatHGE\0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPH
in 1981. The effect of the national day of mourning for Said was sobering, revealing the deep tensions 
between the police force of the Mubarak regime and the greater youth population  in Egypt.  
 
The National F ront for Change 
Inspired by the Kefaya movement, the National Front for Change, led by Nobel Peace prize 
winner Mohammed ElBaradei, was established in early 2010.  ElBaradei announced the formation of the 
QHZIURQWZKLFKKHFODLPHGWREHRSHQ³WRDOO(J\SWLDQVIURPGLIIHUHQWSROLWLFDORULHQWDWLRQV´DQGWKDW
³,WVPDLQWDUJHWZLOOEHSXVKLQJIRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPVDQGVRFLDOMXVWLFH36 7KHJURXS¶VPHVVDJHLVD
JHQHUDOUHVSRQVHWRWKHSROLWLFDOKHLVWSXOOHGRIIE\0XEDUDN¶VUHJLPHLQWKH-2005 parliamentary and 
presidential elections which included constitutional amendments delegitimizing much of the political 
competition from Egyptian elections. Following the revolution in Egypt, it is predicted that the National 
Front for Change will likely put up ElBaradei as a presidential candidate in the ensuing 2011 elections. 
(O%DUDGHLSOD\VDVLJQLILFDQWUROHDVWKHPRYHPHQW¶VOHDGHUDVKHKDVVSHQW\HDUVDEURDGDV
the director of the International Association of Atomic Energy (IAEA) in Vienna, and thus represents the 
³XOWLPDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOGLSORPDW´37 and has uniquely remained above the Egyptian political fray. As the 
director of the IAEA  ElBaradei has also given a hard-line critique of U.S. interests in the Middle East,  
when he clashed with the U.S. over the claim that there were nuclear weapons at stake in Iraq. The 
prospect of ElBaradei as a presidential candidate has been welcomed by Egyptians, who see him as a 
natural leader for their cosmopolitan country. 
 ElBaradei stands on the platform for economic growth, political reform, and social progress of 
WKH 1DWLRQDO )URQW IRU &KDQJH EDVHG RQ WKH UHDOLW\ RI (J\SW¶V IDLOLQJ SROLWLFDO V\VWHP GHHSHQLQJ
economic unrest and growing youth unemployment phenomenon. The potential policy parallels amongst 
the National Front for Change with those of an American vision for a reformed and democratic Egypt are 
VWURQJ DQG WKXV GHVSLWH(O%DUDGHL¶V FRQWURYHUVLDO KLVWRU\ZLWK86 SROLF\PDNHUV LQ WKH SDVW WKH86
would be less than coy if they were not able to see the strengths of supporting ElBaradei and the National 
Front for Change in the coming elections. As told by Stephen Cook of Foreign Affairs  ³6RPHZKDW
SDUDGR[LFDOO\(O%DUDGHL¶VFKLOO\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDV,$($FKLHIRQO\DGYDQFHV86
LQWHUHVWVQRZ´38 
 
The Future 
                                                                                                                    
36 +DVVDQ$PUR³(*<370RKDPHG(O%DUDGHLIRUPV1DWLRQDO)URQWIRU&KDQJH´/$7LPHV%ORJV)HE
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/02/egypt-elbaradei-forms-new-front-for-change.html   
37 &RRN6WHYHQ$³,V(O%DUDGL(J\SW¶V+HUR"´Foreign Affairs. 26 Mar 2010.  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66145/steven-a-cook/egypts-hero  
38 Ibid. 
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$OWKRXJK(J\SW¶V\RXWKKDVPXFKWRFHOHEUDWHZLWKWKHRXVWLQJRIWKH0XEDUDNUHJLPHWKHUHLV
also much more that they will have to work towards if they are to sustain the goals of the revolution. To 
start, there must be a thorough review of the Egyptian constitution, as it has been seriously impaired with 
XQMXVW DQG XQGHPRFUDWLF DPHQGPHQWV RYHU WKH ODVW  \HDUV RI0XEDUDN¶V UXOH%H\RQG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
reform, Egypt will also have to do much more to include its bourgeoning youth population in both the 
national political system and economy. The newfound empowerment of the youth can decisively change 
WKH VKDSH RI (J\SW¶V IXWXUH IRU WKH EHWWHU EULQJLQJ QHZ OHDGHUVKLS DQG HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VNLOOV WR EHDU
VLJQLILFDQWDQGSRVLWLYHFKDQJHRQ(J\SW¶VRXWGDWHGDQGFrumbling infrastructure.  
 On March 19th, 2011, there was a referendum vote in favor of a military-led transition process 
and includes a vigorous election schedule. The ruling military party²Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF)²has indicated that the transition process will happen on a quick timeline, with important 
legal changes to make elections freer and fairer. There is discussion of opening elections to more parties, 
subsequently changing many of the requirements for political nomination. Also tabled for change is the 
electoral system of individual parliamentary districts to a proportional representation system. Such 
electoral reform would allow a break-XSRISDUOLDPHQWDORQJWKHOLQHVRIWKHSDUW\¶VVKDUHRIWKHQDWLRQDO
vote, as compared to the existent measure of giving all the parliamentary seats within a district to the 
victorious party. 
Those who are at the forefront of the political race in Egypt will be those who can win the 
majority vote of the youth population. The candidate most at large is Mohamed ElBaradei for this reason. 
(O%DUDGHL¶V VWURQJ FULWLTXH RI WKH 0XEDUDN UHJLPH DQG FOHDU DUWLFXODWLRQ RI WKH JRDOV RI WKH \RXWK
favoring immediate reforms in the public service and education sectors that will have positive effects on 
the political and economic structures, makes him markedly different from other potential candidates who 
have yet to acknowledge the needs of the youth. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has not put up a 
candidate yet, it is clear that whichever direction the party decides to move in will be influential. It is 
PRVW OLNHO\ WKDW WKH%URWKHUKRRGZLOO WKURZ WKHLU VXSSRUWEHKLQGDQRWKHUSDUW\¶V FDQGLGDWH NHHSLQJ LWV
self-conscious and pragmatic stance in the elections that immediately follow the revolution, but not 
removing LWVHOI IURPSROLWLFVE\DQ\PHDQV7KH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRG¶VIXQGDPHQWDORUJDQL]LQJUROH LQ
the revolution will likely continue in the reconstruction period of Egypt.  
Change will not be easy for Egypt; it will likely be awkward and perhaps even be followed by 
further revolutions if the reforms at stake now do not cut deeply into the causes of current social, 
economic, and political unrest.  The ripple-HIIHFWRI(J\SW¶VUHYROXWLRQWKURXJKRXW1RUWKHUQ$IULFDDQG
the Middle-East may have reverse effects other than regime reform. They can simply create widespread 
violence and even civil war in the region. It is important that the international activist community keep 
careful watch in solidarity on these revolutions so that unnecessary violence can be averted. The broader 
international community has an imperative to act as an overseer in national elections, providing the 
resources necessary to assure free and fair political processes. If further violence spreads in the region (as 
it is in Libya, Syria, and Bahrain), there is a great risk that innocent lives will be lost if no action is taken, 
but also another risk that intervention will be politically motivated and taint the integrity of such political 
and social movements. In this regard, Egypt may be in the end a prime case of how an intensely 
empowered group, such as the youth of Egypt, can make real change for a nation.  
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Conclusions: 
 
In terms of reforms towards a progressive direction in MENA region and Egypt in particular, the 
approach suggested in this paper integrates poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) 
techniques, economic and technical tools of ex-ante and ex-post assessment, and monitoring and 
evaluation methodologies in a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, it stresses the need for 
identifying interested stakeholders and asking questions regarding facilitating and coordinating 
their participation as well as building institutional arrangements that will assure sustainability of 
the human development process. A related aspect is the need for documenting and analyzing 
local historical settings. Finally, progress towards collecting data and building a database of 
relevant indicators, and developing tools of monitoring and evaluation along with the 
development of the institutional and technical capability of stakeholders fall far short and need to 
be developed urgently.  
As this quick and partial review shows, there are many challenges, but also potentially large  
positive returns from the adoption of a democratic human development strategy. Among other 
things, this will also lead to an integration of a green economic development strategy and 
population dynamics issues in a  gender and culturally sensitive manner with equity  . This is 
particularly the case with the youth bulge in many MENA economies including Egypt. In 
conclusion, it may be useful to summarize the policy challenges as well as opportunities ranging 
from substantial strategic, data gathering and coverage issues to the implementation of medium 
term strategies for balanced sustainable human development in this region with special attention 
to youth groups, particularly women and their basic capabilities. One of the most important items 
RQWKLVDJHQGDIURP6HQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHVSHUVSHFWLYHKDVWREHWKHULJKWWRUHSURGXFWLYHKHDOWKRI
women which is also integrally related to their social and economic capabilities and rights. 
 
The first challenge is that of greater involvement of civil society and government actors within the region 
to create a sustainable economy geared towards creating jobs for the youth. The strategic  process needs 
to identify many diverse groups and activists ± particularly among the poorest and the least advantaged ± 
in order to have a truly society wide conversation on the relevance and importance of an integrated 
development cum environmental strategy.As emphasized before, focusing on renewable energy, 
agriculture, forestry, tourism and enhanced ecosystem services among others will be a good start for 
many MENA economies. But such a strategy requires civil society activism for country-specific 
formulation and implementation. Civil society and private sector efforts need to be complemented by 
public sector policies such as  targeted public expenditures, policy reforms and regulatory changes to 
promote further socially-oriented investment and initiatives. It is crucial to find new sources of funding 
that can be used for this purpose. Furthermore, a new trade regime is necessary so that the region can find 
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markets for their green goods and services exports. Transfer of green technology and knowledge also 
needs facilitation through international, national governmental and NGO participation.39 
 
 
Related to this, secondly, the interests of those who live in rural areas, more remote regions and 
are disadvantaged for that reason would need greater representation. The combined 
disadvantages of gender, location and ethnic identification raise particularly salient issues for 
widespread deliberation. In this context, the provision of reproductive health care services in 
environmentally challenged locations assumes great importance. As mentioned before, provision 
of services to the young females is of particular concern. Investment in adolescents and youth 
must make a special effort not to leave out young girls and women. Fewer women than men 
benefit from advanced education and fewer are able to escape poverty. Eliminating child 
marriage, enabling adolescent girls to delay pregnancy, ending discrimination against pregnant 
girls, and providing support to young mothers can help ensure that girls complete an education 
are among the most important policy steps that are needed.  
 
There is an urgent  need to design and implement supportive policies that give young people²male and 
female-- opportunities to reach their full potential and provide all relevant information, including sex-
education, and services young people need to protect their sexual and reproductive health and make 
informed decisions. However, here particularly, the earlier point about political power asymmetries must 
be recognized. Both in the state and civil society the interests of young people must be represented and 
their voices and viewpoints must be heard and and given appropriate weight by decision-makers. The 
ecological and political complexities of these issues---particularly from the points of views of the affected 
groups must be grasped before action is taken from above(Hartmann 1995; Keysers 1994 and 1996) 
 
                                                                                                                    
39  +DVSHU0LFKDHO³*UHHQ7HFKQRORJ\LQ'HYHORSLQJ&RXQWULHV&UHDWLQJ$FFHVVLELOLW\WKURugh 
D*OREDO([FKDQJH)RUXP´Duke Law and Technology Review 001. 1 January 2009. 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2009dltr001.html  
*HFKOLN0HL³0DNLQJ7UDQVIHUof Clean technology Work: Lessons of the Clean 
'HYHORSPHQW0HFKDQLVP´San Diego International Law Journal. 2009. Momete, 
'DQLHOD&ULVWLQD³(QJLQHHULQJ(GXFDWLRQIRU*UHHQ(PSOR\PHQWLQ5RPDQLD´DAAAM 
World Symposium. Volume 20, No. 1. 2009.  
Ndzibah, EmPDQXHO³'LIIXVLRQRI6RODU7HFKQRORJ\LQ'HYHORSLQJ&RXQWULHV)RFXV*URXS
6WXG\LQ*KDQD´Department of Industrial Management, Faculty of Technology, University of 
Vaasa, Vaasa, F inland. 2 June 2010. 
3RZHOO-RH³$IULFD- *UHHQ*URZWK3LRQHHUV"´Africa News Service. 16 February 2011. 
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Third, it must be realized in this context that preaching goals or presenting data by themselves 
will not be enough. At best, they will appear to present cold information without a human face. 
At worst, there is a danger that they may be perceived as cynical and sanctimonious sermons 
while the status quo continues. Concrete step-by-step plans of action with identifiable outcomes 
need to be communicated clearly, and followed through properly. 
 
Fourth, and related to the above, there is a danger of equating government authorship of a 
strategic plan with society wide ownership. To counteract this, it is not sufficient simply to warn 
country representatives of the UN about this danger. In all likelihood, many UN agencies are 
aware of this already. What needs to be done is to persuade and assist the governments who need 
such assistance by concrete non-intrusive steps: by offering resources, technical help and 
working with local government and civil society partners closely. This may even lead to a review 
and recalibration of specific goals, targets and indicators in order to make these more relevant to 
the needs and realities of particular countries. The example of the Chilean dam project with its 
environmental and poverty consequences is a good case in point. 
  
Fifth, the above participation of the local civil society partners must not be seen simply as an 
input to the production of an integrated strategic plan. The further challenge of finding the means 
to implement the strategies for reaching the goals must include an active dialogue and 
collaboration with these groups. This will involve mutual monitoring as well as self-monitoring 
so that a constructive and self-correcting feed back loop can get underway. The role of 
indigenous knowledge, especially in agriculture, indigenous conservation strategies and modes 
of cooperation where these still exist should receive the close attention they deserve. Where 
these are threatened with resulting environmental stress and severe unemployment or 
underemployment of the youth in moving to a poorly designed or haphazardly introduced 
integration with the global markets, the proper blend of the local self-sustained community 
oriented practices with strategic openness to the national and global economies must be 
discovered through participatory field work and other types of relevant empirical research. 
  
Sixth, the plans need to be seen as documents that are based on solid statistical inputs, but are not 
WKHPVHOYHV VWDWLVWLFDO UHSRUWV &RQFHSWXDOL]LQJ WKH FRXQWU\ VWUDWHJLHV DV µFDSDELOLWLHV EDVHG¶
socio-political manifestos for changing the status quo towards more positive freedoms for all, 
and particularly the least advantaged, will put in sharp focus the need for direct, honest and 
substantive documents that can mobilize wide support in society for realizing these goals. 
  
Seventh, having pointed out the need for presenting the strategic plans as statistics based but 
non-statistical documents, it should be emphasized immediately that many statistical challenges 
for preparing substantive strategies in the region remain. This is particularly and acutely true for 
some of the poorest countries. For many countries in Africa, the need for building data gathering 
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and data processing capacities is urgent. Technical and organizational assistance from outside 
will be needed; but the emphasis should be on not just short-term skills and resources for the 
green growth. Rather, strategic investments in training and capacity building need to be made. 
Specifically, physical and human resources in existing organizations should be enhanced; but 
further investments must be made at the regional and local levels to build statistical capacity.  
In this context, competent interdisciplinary research teams with both domestic and international 
experts can engage in building integrated information with a basic social accounting matrix 
approach. Stone had started to move in this direction by posing the problem of integrating 
demographic data bases with SAM, particularly on the factors and household sub-matrices. 
Later, some researchers (Khan and Thorbecke 1988;Khan 1983,1994, 1997a,b;2004a,b; 2006) 
pioneered the integration of energy and environmental factors in the SAM. This process can be 
furthered in a systematic way for use in informed policy analysis of employment creation for the 
youth in particular. For  instance, integrating demographic data bases with production and 
technology sectors in the SAM over time can be used to answer policy questions such as what 
technologies and productive sectors will have the greatest impact on youth employment and 
income generation for the households which have large numbers of young people. 
Disaggregating the factors and household sub-matrices can help us both identify the types of 
green jobs( and other jobs) and the consumption patterns. Various types of models can be built to 
conduct different policy interventions on tax and transfer schemes, investment, environmental 
projects, reproductive health of women and other related interventions. 
 
 Preliminary work done in the context of Indonesia, Bangladesh, India and South Africa show 
that relatively labor-intensive and environmentally less stressful technologies can create more 
jobs overall as well as jobs for the youth than the relatively capital intensive technologies. 
Policies to encourage the private sector investment towards the former type of pro-youth green 
technologies need to be explored and implemented further in the context of the MENA region. 
 
A practical approach, given the current resource constraints for the region---Egypt in particular--
- and the UN will be to pick a few pilot studies countries first. For example two countries in 
North Africa and two in the Middle East can be such a start-up group. Teams of domestic and 
UN sponsored researchers with appropriate technical skills can be set up for each country with 
an overall technical coordinator. Starting with input-output, household income and expenditure 
and labor force surveys and the basic national income accounts statistics a SAM with adequate 
identification of poor households can be set up. Next the environmental and demographic 
statistics can be integrated with the basic SAM to create Environmental-Demographic Human 
Development SAMs (EDHDSAMs). This pilot stage can be accomplished in two years and 
evaluated for extension to all of the region in the next phase. 
  
Eighth, as observed with regards to most countries in the MENA region, there is a need for 
disaggregation of data by gender, ethnicity etc. in addition to locations. Given the substantive 
importance of these categories in terms of identifying and measuring the deprivation of crucial 
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capabilities suffered by many groups, a disaggregation scheme that preserves the basic idea of 
looking at functioning and capabilities of people, but is customized according to the specific 
features of a particular country, needs to be worked out. Here the conceptual task, field work and 
capacity building can proceed together, reinforcing one another. 
  
Ninth, flowing out of the previous points is the need for more active and concrete global 
cooperation. Having well-defined goals, targets and indicators can be a good starting point. But 
delivery of concrete results on the ground is the ultimate test of what value is really being added. 
Concrete steps in identifying and improving upon problems in using aid, trade and other forms of 
international economic relations for enhancing the productive capacity and standard of living of 
the people in the region must be taken. An intensification of these efforts can lead to concrete 
practical results in terms of making progress towards creating capabilities for the youth and 
gender justice. 
  
Finally, there is a need to contextualize policy discussions by moving the discussions regarding 
country strategies beyond reporting from data and towards the utilization of other additional 
qualitative sources. Using these sources, better connections between policies and progress 
towards meeting policy goals could be made. 
 
In conclusion, it should be underlined that even this rather large list is necessarily partial. The 
thinking about an integrated population and environment strategy is still in an early state of 
evolution. As new initiatives and forms of cooperative action emerge at various levels there will 
be a need to go back periodically and reevaluate the country experiences and strategies based on 
these experiences. The importance of pursuing the integrated strategies through a genuine blend 
of domestic and international actors with concrete and contextual national ownership, is 
undeniable. Such a strategy has already registered some modest successes internationally in 
RYHUFRPLQJµDLGIDWLJXH¶DQGRWKHULPSHGLPHQWVWRGHYHOopment to some extent in the post-Cold 
War environment. Within specific countries and in specific green technology areas there are 
some local success stories. The challenge is to broaden and deepen the areas of success and to 
avoid the past mistakes such aV WKHRQHV LQ&KLOHRU LQ ,QGLD¶V1DUPDGDYDOOH\SURMHFWV:LWK
such an approach complemented by genuine global cooperation and domestic political will, new 
and better strategic actions can also be launched, thus converting the challenges into real 
opportunities for meeting the goals of enhancing the capabilities of the youth. The quality of life 
RIWKHPDMRULW\RIWKH(DUWK¶VSRSXODWLRQPD\GHSHQGRQZKHWKHUWKLVFRQYHUVLRQRIFKDOOHQJHV
into opportunities and concrete plans of action takes place within the next few years. The key to 
achieving this, in addition to the localization of goals, targets and strategies, is to follow 
concretely the type of cooperative strategy that is embodied in the three ³pillars´ of sustainable 
development.. Starting with this orientation, strategy-based diagnostics, investment and planning 
services can be geared to the needs of individual countries and further progress can be made 
towards widening access to policy options and strengthening the national capacity to deliver. 
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Thus building on other experiences of participatory assessment of different policies, the 
approach I advocate, besides producing empirical analysis, is intended to engage all actors 
involved (government, business, labour, and civil society institutions representing different 
segments of the population, in particular women) in active participation. This is where 
movement towards deepening democracy in the sense discussed in part I of this paper requires 
strengthening. In this context, the analysis of the situation in Egypt reveals the complexities of a 
transition towards a regime of genuine human development in the sense of  capabilities 
enhancement. 
 
There is no simple way to sum up the ongoing processes that are unfolding from below in Egypt-
--and one suspects in many other parts of the world. In conclusion it is worth emphasizing that a 
deeper, more critical theory that links political and social economic analysis with the possibilities 
of social movements for capabilities enhancement is essential to avoid superficial readings of 
these movements. While there is much to be critical about these movements per se, the very 
existence and evolution of these movements demonstrate the contradictions of global capital 
during its neoliberal policy phase. As Cafruny and Ryner point out in the context of EU, the need 
for a critical political economic analysis remains as salient as ever. 
 
     That such[progressive] alternatives have gained so little traction in the face of massive economic dislocation 
points rather to the underlying power realities of the contemporary European project and the diminished stature of 
the Left throughout Europe.    The crisis of the eurozone is an object lesson in the power of capital to determine the 
nature and scope of  integration.   Notwithstanding their theoretical neutrality and independence, European 
institutions have served  this power whilst foreclosing  prospects for genuine European solidarity.  The crisis is 
deepening conflicts among member states and weakening public confidence in the Union.40   
 
The study of Egypt also supports the theory presented here. It also exposes the difficulties of 
popular movements to articulate a coherent deeply democratic strategy without clarity about 
class and gender issues in particular. While avoiding narrow, sectarian and dogmatic class 
analysis, a new deeper, richer analysis that addresses the complexities of the economy, polity and 
society in the 21st century global political economy is  required. The current analysis is best 
viewed as a first tentative step towards this goal.  
 
  In Egypt, this means that politically a democratic platform and organization is a prime necessity 
if the revolution is to lead to genuine capabilities enhancement. Inter alia, such a movement will 
follow an economic strategy of growth plus poverty reduction. But beyond this, the increase of 
well-being of all marginal members of society, particularly women is a must. For Egypt, it will 
also mean rethinking the neoliberal strategy and adopting a more heterodox political economic 
strategy along the lines outlined in part II of this paper. In attempting such progressive reforms 
Egyptians will need the help from all progressive governments, NGOs, intellectuals and activists 
from all over the world. This is the ultimate global challenge for capabilities enhancement 
thrown up by the Egyptian revolution. 
                                                                                                                    
40 See Cafruny and Ryner(2011) p.25. 
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Appendix 1: A H istorical Background to Capabilities Approach 
It is no less true of economics than in real life that fads and fashions have a peculiar hold on 
modern imagination. Perhaps the prevalence of such ephemeral fads and fashions led Robert Frost to 
SURFODLPLQKLVSRHPµ7KH%ODFN&RWWDJH¶ 
 
«why abandon a belief 
Merely because it ceases to be true. 
Cling to it long enough, and not a doubt 
It will turn true again, for so it goes. 
Most of the change we think we see in life 
Is due to truths being in and out of favor. 
 
7KHUHGLVFRYHU\RIDPRUHµREMHFWLYH¶VRFLDOFDSDELOLWLHVSHUVSHFWLYHLQGHYHORSPHQWHFRQRPLFVLV
a good case in point. The transition from classical Bentham-Mill type of utilitarianism to a modern 
Paretian subjective utility was completely triumphant by the 1930s when Robbins launched his 
devastatingly successful challenge against interpersonal comparison of utility. Subsequent work by 
Bergson and Samuelson on social welfare functions attempted a new type of normative evaluation of 
HFRQRPLFVWDWHVKRZHYHU$UURZ¶VLPSRVVLELOLW\WKHRUHPDWOHDVWLQLWVLQLWLDOWUDMHFWRU\VHHPHGWRPDQ\
to have destroyed the analytical basis for any normative welfare economics whatsoever. 
 
It was the brilliant analytical work of Sen in his Collective Choice and Social Welfare that raised 
a number of deep questions that led to a reappraisal of the whole utilitarian approach and eventually to the 
rediscovery of the capabilities approach. As Sen himself has graciously pointed out,41his initial insights 
regarding capabilities came from reading Adam Smith. In a number of essays on poverty--- some of 
which came out from the ILO in about 1976--- Sen exploreGWKHµ6PLWKLDQ¶YLHZWKDWWKHUHDUH
µIXQFWLRQLQJV¶RILQGLYLGXDOVLQVRFLHW\6HQDOVRVKRZHGWKDWVXFKIXQFWLRQLQJVFDQQRWEHVLPSO\
expressed as utilities without the risk of serious distortion and confusion. Subsequently, Martha 
                                                                                                                    
41 6HH+$.KDQµ$&RQYHUVDWLRQZLWK$PDUW\D6HQ¶1<&7KH9RLFHRI%DQJODGHVK 
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Nussbaum has traced the Aristotlean connections of functionings and capabilities, and Khan has pointed 
out the Hegelian and Marxian elements in a fully social conceptualization of capabilities. 
  
Since the revival of the idea of capability, there have been empirical applications and an interest 
shown by policymakers who are serious about reducing poverty and increasing the well-being of people 
through the process of economic development. The most notable example is the idea of a human 
development index or the HDI, promoted by the UN. Although the correspondence between a rigorous 
conception of capabilities and the HDI is not exact, and conceptual problems remain, the reach of the 
concept has already gained broad appeal.  
During the late 1980s and 1990s Sen explored further the connections between capabilities and 
µSRVLWLYH¶IUHHGRP7KHVHH[SORUDWLRQVFXOPLQDWHGILUVWLQDPDVWHUO\PRQRJUDSK42 and in 1999, a 
magisterial statement on development which, as Sen argued forcefully and imaginatively, is really 
(positive) freedom. 
 
This brLHI KLVWRULFDO LQWURGXFWLRQ FDQQRW GR MXVWLFH WR WKH GHSWK DQG FRPSOH[LW\ RI WKLV µQHZ¶
approach to development. In the rest of this chapter, I intend to explore a few dimensions of the concept 
EHJLQQLQJZLWK$PDUW\D6HQ¶VSLRQHHULQJFRQWULEXWLRQV7KLVLV the theme of the next section (section 2). 
In section 3, I look at clarifications by Nussbaum and others and offer a list of important functionings that 
can be included in the capabilities set. Section 4 builds on this by exploring the transition from a 
utilitarian welfare economics to a fully social capabilities based ethics for a just development. Section 5 
goes further in the direction of concretizing the idea in a Hegelian sense by discussing the role of a 
network of social, economic and political institutions in creating social capabilities. This   allows us to 
develop the argument that freedom is to be viewed dynamically as the development of appropriate social 
capabilities embedded in social, economic and political institutions. The following section then presents 
an example of a concrete area of application--- QDPHO\WKHSUREOHPRIGHYHORSLQJZRPHQ¶VFDSDELOLWLHV
as an important aspect of global justice--- in order to illustrate the practical relevance of the capabilities 
approach. 
The final, concluding section summarizes and reflects on the future of the social capabilities 
approach as an evaluative framework for development economics. 
 
 
 
2. T H E PI O N E E RIN G C O N T RIBU T I O NS O F A M A R T Y A SE N 
 
                                                                                                                    
42 Sen 1992. Inequality Reexamined 
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One way to enter into a discussion of capabilities is via a critique of alternative approaches. 
Another, more positive and direct way, is to consider the meaning of normative concepts such as 
µHTXDOLW\+HUH,ZLOOWDNHWKHVHFRQGPRUHGLUHFWURXWH 
In his preface to Inequality Reexamined, Sen himself is quite forthright: 
 
7KHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQLQWKHDQDO\VLVDQGDVVHVVPHQWRIHTXDOLW\LV,DUJXHKHUHµHTXDOLW\RI
ZKDW"¶,DOVRDUJXHWKDWDFRPPRQFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIYLUWXDOO\DOOWKHDSSURDFKHVWRWKHHWKLFVRI
social arrangements that have stood the test of time is to want equality of something---something 
WKDWKDVDQLPSRUWDQWSODFHLQWKDWSDUWLFXODUWKHRU\1RWRQO\GRWKHLQFRPHHJDOLWDULDQV«
demand equal incomes, and welfare-egalitarians ask for equal welfare levels, but also classical 
utilitarians insist on equal weights on the utilities of all, and pure libertarians demand equality 
with respect to an entire class of rights and liberties.43(Italics in the original) 
 
6HQ¶VDQVZHUWRWKLVTXHVWLRQµHTXDOLW\RIZKDW"¶LVWKDWZKDWZHQHHGWRHTXDOL]HLVQRWLQFRPH
or utility, but capabilities. His argument on the positive side proceeds from a recognition of individual 
diversities and the different abilities of particular individuals to convert income, resources or commodities 
to actual functionings. Here, it may be useful to distinguish between functionings and capabilities. 
Individual functionings are distinctive levels of doing certain things or living a particular aspect of life. 
For example, the level of nourishment or general state of health. Capabilities can be thought of as a set of 
all potentially available functionings that are achievable for a particular person with a certain amount of 
resources. A person may then choose a vector of maximal functionings from the set.44 Thus, underlying 
the capabilities perspective is a respect for individual diversities. At the same time, the principle of 
HTXDOL]LQJFDSDELOLWLHVLQ6HQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIGHYHORSPHQWOHDGVWRDSROLF\RIUHGLVWULEXWLQJUHVRXUFHV
towards certain socially and economically disadvantaged groups--- women, in particular. 
 
6HQ¶VIRFXVRQGLYHUVLW\LVTXLWHFOHDU+HVWDWHV 
 
«WKHGLYHUVLW\RIVSDFHVLQZKLFKHTXDOLW\PD\EHGHPDQGHGUHIOHFWVDGHHSHUGLYHUVLW\WRZLW
different diagnoses of objects of value--- different views of appropriate notions of individual 
DGYDQWDJHLQWKHFRQWH[WVLQTXHVWLRQ«/LEHUWLHVULJKWVXWLOLWLHVLQFRPHVUHVRXUFHVSULPDU\
                                                                                                                    
43 Sen 1992. Inequality Reexamined, p.ix. 
44 Or, to be more general and cover all possibilities consistent with mathematical set theory, there may be more than 
one best element as well. 
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goods, need-fulfillments etc., provide different ways of seeing the respective lives of different 
people, and each of the perspectives leads to a corresponding view of equality.45 
 
7KHVKHHUEHDXW\RI6HQ¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWKHWKHQIRFXVHVRQLQGLYLGXDOGLYHUVLWLHVWRSLQSRLQW
the role of capabilities as a more encompassing and fundamental space in which inequality comparisons 
can and should take place. In a sweeping fashion capabilities are then connected with rights, justice and 
ultimately freedom.46 
 
Just as wealth creation is to be judged by the yardstick of capabilities creation, poverty or 
deprivation in general is also redefined as not just inadequate income, but as more fundamental 
inadequacies of capabilities. Since poverty reduction is considered by some to be the central problem of 
development47, it is worthwhile to discuss this further. 
 
There is by now a vast literature on measurement of poverty. Theoretically, the seminal 
SDSHUZDV6HQ¶VD[LRPDWL]DWLRQDQGWKHDVVRFLDWHGLQGH[WKDWDWWHPSWHGWREULQJWRJHWKHU
the headcount ratio, the income gap ratio and income inequalities among the poor within a 
consistent axiomatic framework. Since then, as stated above, Sen and others following him have 
moved in the direction of a multidimensional approach to poverty as inadequate capabilities 
 
7KHJHQHUDOLQWXLWLRQEHKLQGSRYHUW\PHDVXUHPHQWLVWKDWµSRYHUW\¶H[LVWVZKHQDJURXSRISHRSOH
in a particular soFLHW\FDQQRWDWWDLQD µPLQLPXP¶ OHYHORIZHOO-EHLQJ7KHµPLQLPXP¶ LVDW OHDVWSDUWO\
dependent upon the prevailing standards of society. However, there are dimensions of well-being such as 
nutritional requirements that might actually constitute an absolute biological minimum. The idea behind 
absolute as opposed to relative poverty is that by using generally agreed upon minimum standards of 
well-being, we can, in fact, define an income poverty line. Such income poverty line gives the cut-off 
point below which everyone is deemed to be poor. The key questions in applying this idea of poverty for 
applied policy issues are: 
 
2. How do we assess well-being? 
3. How do we decide on a certain poverty line so that when a poor person crosses that threshold 
s/he is no longer poor? 
 
These are the questions which ask us to identify who the poor are. Therefore, this can be 
FDOOHGXVLQJ6HQ¶VWHUPLQRORJ\WKH³LGHQWLILFDWLRQ´RISRYHUW\$VDVHFRQGVWHSWKHWRWDO
                                                                                                                    
45 Sen.1992, p.25 
46 See Khan 1998, ch. 7 for a discussion and critique of some these positions and connections. 
47 Of course, not everyone agrees. See, for example, Hayami (2003). 
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SLFWXUHRISRYHUW\LVDUULYHGDWE\DJJUHJDWLQJ+HQFH6HQ¶VFRLQDJHRIWKHWHUP³DJJUHJDWLRQ
SUREOHP´+HDGFRXQWUDWLRLVRQHREYLRXVH[DPSOHLQZKLFKRQHVLPSO\FRXQWVWKHQXPEHURI
people below the poverty line and then divides this number by the total number of individuals in 
a particular society.  
 
In terms of identifying the poor through the setting of the poverty line, a number of issues can 
arise. The following four questions are one way of raising some these issues (Fields 2001): 
 
1. Is the basis income or consumption, and how comprehensively will either one be measured? 
2.  What is the income-receiving unit: individual, family, per capita, or adult equivalent? 
3. Will there be a single poverty line or will there be separate ones for urban and rural areas or 
different regions of the country? 
4.  Is the poverty line income determined scientifically, politically, subjectively, or as a matter 
of convenience? 
 
In terms of both identification and aggregation of poverty, the procedure depends partly 
on axiomatizing the concept of poverty so that any particular measure has a number of desirable 
properties. The most common axioms are focus, anonymity, population homogeneity, 
monotonicity or strong monotonicity, and distributional sensitivity. Among the commonly used 
indexes, the head count ratio fails both the strong monotonicity and distributional sensitivity 
axioms. Converting the various axioms from the space of income to the space of capabilities 
makes comparison more difficult although, as seen above, the approach is conceptually 
appealing.48 
 
Sen (1999) suggests several ways of comparing capability information as a way out of 
such difficulties. First, there is the direct approach. One might be able to examine directly the 
vectors of functionings and capabilities. In some cases, if one is lucky a total comparison ranking 
all such vectors of functionings and capabilities with respect to one another in terms of poverty 
may be possible. However, in many instances one may not be so lucky. Even then, a partial 
ranking of some vectors of functionings and capabilities compared with the others may be 
possible. Finally, one may wish to emphasize a particular dimension such as health. Sen calls 
VXFK H[HUFLVHV µdistinguished capability comparison¶49 Notice that if the particular dimension 
chosen is income, then we are back to comparing income poverty. 
 
Secondly, there is the supplementary approach. The supplementary approach makes use 
of standard traditional procedures of comparison in income space. However, such comparisons 
are supplemented by information on functionings or capabilities. An example will be the 
DXJPHQWDWLRQRIWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VRQHRUWZRGROODUVDGD\SRYHUW\DQDO\VLVZLWKLQIRUPDWLRQRQ
ORQJHYLW\OLWHUDF\ZRPHQ¶VVWDWXVHWF 
                                                                                                                    
48 For a discussion of some of these problems see Sen (1992,1999), Khan and Sonko (1994) and Khan and Parvin 
(1984),  
49 See Sen (1999), pp.81-85 
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Finally, a third approach which is more ambitious than the supplementary approach relies 
on the notiRQRIVRPHDGMXVWPHQWWRLQFRPH6HQPHQWLRQVWKDW¶«IDPLO\LQFRPHOHYHOVPD\EH
DGMXVWHGGRZQZDUGE\LOOLWHUDF\DQGXSZDUGE\KLJKOHYHOVRIHGXFDWLRQ¶,QKLVZRUNFRQQHFWLQJ
environmental damage with inequality and poverty, Khan (1997) uses a concept of adjusted 
income ZKHUH DPRQHWDU\ HTXLYDOHQWRI HQYLURQPHQWDO GDPDJHV LV VXEWUDFWHG IURPHYHU\RQH¶V
income. He then goes on to show that even if these damages are distributed equally--- a 
FRQVHUYDWLYHµHTXDOLW\RIPLVIRUWXQHV¶ assumption--- under the standard axioms of inequality and 
poverty comparisons both inequality and poverty as measured under the adjusted income 
distribution is in almost all cases larger than in the unadjusted case. Thus this third approach, 
called the indirect approach by Sen, can be of use as well. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude from the above discussion that in spite of some 
measurement problems, the concept of capabilities as advanced by Sen, could be operationalized, 
at least partially. There were, however, some need for further conceptual clarification of the 
initial formulation of capabilities as well. This is where the contributions of Nussbaum and 
others become relevant. I now turn to a brief discussion of these and some related issues. 
 
 
4. C L A RI F I C A T I O NS B Y NUSSB A U M A ND O T H E RS: C O NN E C T I O NS W I T H 
A RIST O T L E , H E G E L , M A R X A ND F O U C A U L T 
 
 
In a number of influential and insightful contributions Martha Nussbaum has developed 
an Aristotlean interpretation of capabilities. The connections between capabilities and a distinctly 
Aristotlean conception of human flourishing are indeed striking. Later in this section I will 
discuss a list of general capabilities drawing upon both Sen and Nussbaum. The Aristotlean 
connections, I hope will become quite clear through this exercise in comparison and contrast. 
 
In Technology, Development and Democracy, I have pointed out some Hegelian 
connections as well. In particular, the Hegelian conception of freedom as an interactive 
arrangement in society where concrete institutions of family, civil society and state all play 
definite roles seem a specifically modern way of viewing the possibilities and limits of human 
IORXULVKLQJ LQ D OLEHUDO VRFLHW\ EDVHG RQ SULYDWH SURSHUW\ +HJHO¶V Philosophy of Right is a 
landmark contribution, in this sense, to the elucidation of the problem of freedom in modern 
societies. 
 
If we turn now to the equally interesting thesis of Gilbert (1990) that Marx was an 
Aristotlean in his critique of alienation, it can be seen that such a conception of the theory of 
alienation supports the emphasis on the capabilities as non-alienated set of qualities that are 
potentially attainable, but may actually be by and large unachievable under the existing 
LQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWV*LOEHUWSRLQWVRXW WKDW LQVRPHSDUWVRI&DSLWDO0DU[³«FRPSDUHG 
SURGXFWLYHDFWLYLW\LQJHQHUDOZLWKODERUXQGHUFDSLWDOLVPLQDSXUHO\$ULVWRWOHDQZD\´0DU[¶V
FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RI0LOWRQ¶V ODERUV RQ WKH3DUDGLVH/RVW DV VHOI-motivated, non-alienated labor 
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and his contrast of such labor with that of a hack writer who writes only for the money he 
receives from the capitalist publisher underlines the good of genuine life-affirming labor. 
,URQLFDOO\ LQ UHDO OLIH XQGHU FDSLWDOLVP DQG LQ ERXUJHRLV SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\0LOWRQ¶V ODERU LV
µXQSURGXFWLYH¶50 ZKLOHWKHKDFNLVDµSURGXFWLYH¶ZDJH-laborer.  
 
In Capital, Marx shows how the accumulated dead labor in the form of capital dominates 
workers. Workers are mere means of further accumulation. Under the sign of capital death 
dominates over life and denies the workers the necessary opportunity to realize their potential to 
EH IUHH FUHDWLYH EHLQJV $V *LOEHUW SRLQWV RXW 0DU[¶V VHHPLQJO\ QRQPRUDO VWDUWLQJ SRLQW RI
analyzing commodities ultimately leads to a moral critique of capital as a social relation. 
Interestingly, a qualitative labor theory of value (QLTV) that is being currently developed by a 
group of thinkers who are of Hegelian orientation as well would seem to imply such a moral 
critique as well.51 In particular, going beyond abstract labor means recognizing the use 
value/exchange value distinction as emerging in a historically specific, alienated and alienating 
mode of production. Going beyond such a distinction ultimately means going beyond the value 
form itself in the political economic sphere, or rather more broadly, a transvaluation of values52 
in a society of the future that can result from a transformation of capitalist social relations 
historically. 
 
Taking the QLTV as the central explanatory framework and connecting it with 
eudaemonism can also help illuminate Foucault¶V LPSRUWDQW LQVLJKWV DERXW WKH VRFLHWLHV RI
discipline and control that form a part of his critique of modernity. From this point of view such 
developments are consistent with the reproduction of the value form under the domination of 
capital. Foucault shows how the discipline of the army served as the model for discipline in the 
factory. In fact, for Foucault, virtually every institution is permeated with this disciplinary mode 
of functioning until a more subtle and manipulative system of control can be developed. 
 
)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRIELR-power53 is a particularly powerful way of characterizing how 
the production and reproduction of life itself can become an object of control under capitalism. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzes in detail how the human body can be objectified. 
7KHIXQGDPHQWDOJRDORIWKHGLVFLSOLQDU\SRZHUZDVWRFUHDWHD³GRFLOHERG\´$WWKHVDPHWLPH
this docile body also needed to be a productive body. Looked at from the perspective of QLTV, 
this implies nothing less than the total alienation of flesh and spirit. Once again, the problem 
from the human point of view---LQ VSLWH RI WKH LURQLFDOO\ DYRZHG ³DQWL-KXPDQLVP´ RI HDUO\
Foucault----then becomes: how to overcome this alienation?  
 
We now turn to this problem. If, as I have argued so far, the abolition of alienation 
requires the abolition of capital as a relation of domination, can QLTV throw any light on how to 
abolish capital as a social relation? Could capabilities then be reconstrued in a more radically 
                                                                                                                    
50 That is, under the strict assumption that no wage payments were made. 
51 Gilbert (1990) ch. 7. 
52 The Nietzschean language is intentional. A radical interpretation of both Marx and Nietzsche can find much that is 
in common in ethics between these two revolutionary thinkers of the nineteenth century. 
53 See Foucault (1978, 19DQG'UH\IXVDQG5DELQRZ)RXFDXOW¶VGHEWWR1LHW]VFKHDVIDUDVWKH
exploration of biopower among other things, through a genealogical study is concerned, has been acknowledged by 
Foucault himself. 
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critical way by following this Aristotlean-Hegelian-Marxian connection? In the rest of this 
chapter, I show that this can be done and explore the further implications of this move for 
development theory and policy. In what follows, I first give a characterization of capabilities 
following Sen, Nussbaum and others. I then discuss the fully social and political nature of these 
capabilities. 
 
 Capabilities can be construed as general powers of human body and mind under specified 
social, economic and political structures that can be acquired, maintained, nurtured and 
developed.  They can also (under circumstances such as malnutrition or severe confinement) be 
diminished and even completely lost.  I have emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social (not 
merely biological) character of these human capabilities.  Sen himself emphasizes "a certain sort 
RI SRVVLELOLW\ RU RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU IXQFWLRQLQJ´ ZLWKRXW DOZD\V FDUHIXOO\ VSHFLI\LQJ WKH
institutional setting. 
 
 In order to assess the critical reach of such a fully social capabilities perspective we need 
to go further and try to describe more concretely what some of the basic capabilities may be.  
David Crocker has given an admirable summary of both Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to 
capabilities in a recent essay.  Mainly relying on Nussbaum but also on other sources (shown 
below), he has compiled a list that is worth reproducing here: 
 
 %DVLF+XPDQµ6RFLDO¶54Capabilities (N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen", 
respectively; the quoted items come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted). 
 
1. Capabilities in Relation to Mortality 
1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, so far as is possible 
1.2.  1.2. N: Being able to be courageous 
 
2. Bodily Capabilities 
2.1. N and S: "Being able to have good health. 
2.2.  2.2.  N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished. 
2.3. N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter 
2.4.  2.4.  N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction" 
2.5. N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place 
 
3. Pleasure 
                                                                                                                    
54 0\XVDJHRIVRFLDOLVDNLQWR*LOEHUW¶V XVHRIµVRFLDO¶LQVRFLDOWKHRU\,PSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOIHDWXUHVDUHDOVR
LQFOXGHGLQWKHFDWHJRU\RIµVRFLDO¶+RZHYHUDVDERYH,ZLOOXVHµVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO¶DOVRWRXQGHUOLQHWKHVDOLHQFH
of both political ideas and practices. 
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3.1. N and S: "Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have pleasurable 
experiences 
 
4. Cognitive Virtues 
 4.1.  N: "Being able to use the five senses" 
 4.2.  N: "Being able to imagine" 
 4.3.  N: "Being able to think and reason" 
 4.4.  N and S: "Being acceptably well-informed/ 
 
5. Affiliation I (Compassion) 
 5.1.  N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" 
 5.2.  N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude" 
   
6. Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency) 
 6.1.  N: "Being able to form a conception of the good 
          S: "Capability to choose ; "ability to form goals, commitments, values 
 6.2.  N and S: "Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life" 
 
7. Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice) 
 7.1.  N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings,      to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction" 
 7.1.1.  N: Being capable of friendship 
       S: Being able to visit and entertain friends 
 7.1.2.  S: Being able to participate in the community 
 7.1.3.  N: Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice 
 
8. Ecological Virtue 
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 8.1.  N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of 
nature" 
   
9. Leisure 
 9.1.  N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities" 
  
10. Separateness 
 10.1.  N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's 
 10.2.  N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context" 
  
11. Self-respect 
 11.1.  S: "Capability to have self-respect" 
 11.2.  S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame" 
 
12. Human Flourishing 
 12.1.  N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural 
possibilities" 
 12.2.  S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings" 
 
 $V&URFNHUFRUUHFWO\SRLQWVRXWZHFDQIDFLOLWDWHWKLVRUGHULQJE\UHTXLULQJWKDWµ«
it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to "infuse" but not "organize" the 
RWKHU YLUWXHV¶&URFNHU contrasts Nussbaum's approach with Sen's.  Sen's and Nussbaum's 
lists differ at a few points.  For Sen, the bodily capabilities and functionings are intrinsically 
good and not, as they are in some dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental 
means to other (higher) goods.  In interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes between 
bodily functionings that are chosen and intentional, for instance, "chosen self-nutritive and 
reproductive activities that form part of a reason-guided life" and those that are non-
intentional, such as digestion and other "functioning of the bodily system in sleep".   
 
Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items such as "being able to have attachments to things 
and persons outside ourselves" and "being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants 
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and the world of nature", for which Sen has no counterparts.  These items are welcome features.  Item 8, 
"ecological virtue", is an especially important addition to Nussbaum's outlook.  In a period when many 
are exploring ways of effecting a convergence between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is 
important that an essentially anthropocentric ethic "make room" for respect for other species and for 
ecological systems.  Worth considering is whether Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough.  
Perhaps it should be formulated to read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and nature as intrinsically valuable."  Item 9 injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise 
marked by the "spirit of seriousness."  What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's list, their 
absence on Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete texture often displayed in Nussbaum's 
descriptions?  One hypothesis is that the differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention to the limits, 
vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence.  Further, it may be that Nussbaum's richer conception of 
human beings derives from making use of the story-telling imagination far more than the scientific 
intellect."  On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of self-respect, a virtue that enables him to 
find common ground with Rawls and to establish links with the Kantian ethical tradition, in which moral 
agents have the obligation to respect all persons, including themselves, as ends-in-themselves . 
 
 Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of central 
importance.  One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another.  At most, 
one can do so in a very limited way.  They cannot be reduced to a common measure such as 
utility. 
 
 As Crocker points out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights and justice going far 
beyond simple distribution of income considerations.  If one accepts the capability approach as a serious 
foundation for human development, then it follows that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for 
a complete evaluation of the impact of economic policies.  
 
 
 In evaluating any policy regime --- for instance international financial regimes and 
national economic policies under globalization --- from this perspective not only do we wish to 
pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding human freedom.  In 
particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain things.  Thus, creation of markets 
and efficient production by itself would mean very little if it led to a lopsided distribution of 
benefits.  Worse yet, if markets and other institutions led to phenomena such as reduced life 
expectancy, increased unemployment, reduced consumption levels for many and deprivation for 
certain groups such as women and minorities then they will not even be weakly equitable global 
economic structure.  On the contrary, under such circumstances, the global markets and other 
financial institutions will be strongly inequitable from the capability perspective. 
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It is because of this perspective that the existing positive analysis of the problems of 
global financial markets and instituWLRQV QHHG WR EH SXW LQ D FRPSOHWHO\ WUDQVSDUHQW ³VRFLDO
FDSDELOLWLHV´ IUDPHZRUN55 Such a framework is openly normative and makes a strong ethical 
case for helping the disadvantaged increase their capabilities towards achieving equality of 
capabilities. Thus, for instance, poorer nations and poor people in the global economy deserve a 
special ethical attention within any proposed global financial architecture. As Khan (1998) 
shows in the context of adopting innovation structures leading to increased productivities, 
ultimately the aim of any increase in productivity needs to be the increase of freedom. Such 
freedom, as Sen (1999) points out has both an instrumental value and an ultimate value. 
Instrumentally, freedom as social capabilities can lead to a further increase in productivity. Thus 
even a hard-nosed, efficiency driven analysis must address this aspect as an empirical issue. 
Therefore, an Aristotlean interpretation of Sen- Nussbaum conceptualization of capabilities can 
go a long way towards a social democratic regime of development as freedom, and this is much 
to be applauded. However, pushing the concept of social capabilities in the Hegel-Marx direction 
of overcoming alienation by achieving freedom as a concrete universal requires a very radical 
form of global social democracy. I now turn to a demonstration of this thesis. 
 
 
5. F R O M U T I L I T A RI A N W E L F A R E E C O N O M I CS T O A SO C I A L C APA BI L I T I ES 
B ASE D E T H I CS 
 
The utilitarian tradition in economics, as Sen correctly reminds us is based on three 
distinct components. One of these is consequentialism. All choices of actions, rules, institutions 
etc. must be judged by the consequences of the particular choice made. In this sense, 
consequentialism is merely results oriented. It does, however, rule out purely or exclusively 
rights- based or deontological decision rules. A second constituting element of utilitarianism is 
ZKDW6HQKDVWHUPHGµZHOIDULVP¶$FFRUGLQJWR6HQZHOIDULVPµ«UHVWULFWVWKHMXGJPHQWVRIVWDWH
RIDIIDLUVWRWKHXWLOLWLHVLQWKHUHVSHFWLYHVWDWHV«¶&RPELning welfarism with consequentialism, 
RQHFDQGHULYHWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWµ«HYHU\FKRLFHPXVWEHMXGJHGE\WKHUHVSHFWLYHXWLOLWLHVLW
JHQHUDWHV¶ 
 
Finally, the third element, namely, sum-ranking of utilities imposes an aggregation scheme 
whereby utilities of different people can simply be summed together without bothering about their 
distribution over the entire population. This neatly sidesteps who gets what; but it is clearly the greatest 
good under the three conditions when utility is the only good to consider. Notice that Robbins attacked 
the classical utilitarian idea of interpersonal comparability and by implication sum-ranking of utilities in 
the 1930s. But the alternative, radically subjective view of personal utility also sidesteps the issue of 
distribution. No two Pareto optimal states are, strictly speaking, comparable. In general equilibrium 
theory the second theorem of welfare economics merely states that under a suitable redistribution of 
                                                                                                                    
55 See Khan (2004, forthcoming) for advocating an approach in this spirit with regards the role of globalization. 
Khan (1997) applies this framework to an evaluation of trading regimes from the point of view of economic justice 
in Africa in particular. 
69  
  
initial endowments, every Pareto optimal state can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium. However, 
there is no bias towards---or, for that matter, against--- an egalitarian distribution. 
 
:KDW6HQ¶VPRUHUDGLFDOFULWLTXHRIXWLOLWDULDQLVPDQGKLVUHSODFHPHQWRIXWLOLW\ZLWKFDSDELOLWLHV
have done is to change the paradigmatic terms of discourse. It is no longer necessary to debate the various 
meanings of utility and what the distribution of utilities should be. The talk about utilities has been 
replaced by talk about positive, concrete freedoms, as the Sen-Nussbaum list of capabilities above 
demonstrates.  
 
With this radical shift of the terrain of discourse, however, there is also a set of new questions that 
arises. What are the social, political and economic conditions under which capabilities are best promoted 
for all the people in an equalizing direction. Both the levels and distribution of capabilities are important. 
3HUKDSVUHVSRQGLQJLQDQLQGLUHFWZD\WRHDUOLHUFULWLFLVPV6HQKDVRXWOLQHGWKHµSHUVSHFWLYHRIIUHHGRP¶
more definitely. Freedom is important both for evaluative and for effectiveness reasons. Evaluation of 
societies by the actual amount of substantive freedoms enjoyed by people is radically different from using 
utility, procedural liberty, real income etc. E ffectiveness reason UHVWV RQ 6HQ¶V claim that freedom 
HQKDQFHVWKHµDJHQF\¶RIWKHLQGLYLGXDOOHDGLQJWRJUHDWHULQGLYLGXDOLQLWLDWLYHDQGVRFLDOHIIHFWLYHVRFLDO
participation. Thus freedom can be viewed as both the primary end and the principal means for 
development. Sen also gives a five fold classification of instrumental freedoms as consisting of political 
freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. In the 
UHVW RI WKLV VHFWLRQ , DUJXH WKDW D SHUVSHFWLYH RI JOREDO µGHHS GHPRFUDF\¶ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 6HQ¶V
characterization of freedom leads us to a consistent critique of the existing political and socioeconomic 
arrangements globally. Following the enlightenment project as formulated by Kant, and the critique of 
Kantian understanding by +HJHODQGILQDOO\WKHµWKLV-VLGHG¶ZRUOGO\FULWLTXHRI+HJHOE\)HXHUEDFKDQG
WKH GLDOHFWLFDO FULWLTXH RI )HXHUEDFK¶V RQHVLGHGPDWHULDOLVP E\0DU[ WDNHV XV WR D TXHVWLRQLQJ RI WKH
existing institutions when these fail to promote and equalize social capaELOLWLHV 7KH WKHRU\ RI µGHHS
GHPRFUDF\¶FDSWXUHVPDQ\RIWKHVHFRQFHUQV 
 
Building on both the contributions of classical thinkers from at least Rousseau onwards, 
but also on modern theories of participatory and strong democracy advanced by scholars such as 
Barber deep democracy advances the thesis of equalization of capabilities as a central concern of 
global economic justice. Most important from this perspective is the work by scholars such as 
Alan Gilbert (1990) on radical democracy that is internationalist and welcomes mass activism. 
 
Extending the important earlier work of Gilbert, Khan (1992, 1993a,b; 1995, 1998, 
2004a,b) in a number of essays and books establishes the claim of equalizing social capabilities 
along with global justice as central elements of a sufficiently rich conception of democracy 
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which respects the rights of citizens underlying the core concept of democracy. Conceiving 
ULJKWVIROORZLQJ6HQDVµJRDOULJKWV¶LVRQHZD\WRGHIHQGWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIFDSDELOLWLHV$QRWKHU
way is to view these rights--- most importantly, the right to self-determination--- as self-
sustaining if and only if movement towards equalization of capabilities can be sustained globally. 
([WHQGLQJ*LOEHUW¶VFOXVWHUFRQGLWLRQVIRUGHPRFUDF\56 Khan (1992, 1998) establishes that three 
clusters are of particular significance. The political cluster begins with formal democratic 
SULQFLSOHV RI XQLYHUVDO VXIIUDJH DQG HOHFWLRQV EXW GRHV QRW VWRS WKHUH $OWKRXJK WKLV µIRUPDO
GHPRFUDF\¶PXVWEHGHIHQGHGYLJRURXVO\LWLVVHHQDVone aspect of a deeper form of democracy 
that various polities are moving towards. 
 
In order to gain insight into these deeper form, we need to ask what conditions can 
sustain freedom which is the core idea underlying democracy. The answer is that as soon as 
freedom is conceived positively and not just as mere absence of coercions, capabilities come to 
the fore. However, probing deeply into the project of enhancing and equalizing the capabilities of 
citizens even in a rough, practical sense economic and cultural conditions come to be seen as 
crucial. For example, education, including critical ethical and political education is recognized as 
of utmost importance. In so far as democratic movements for a just society have been schools for 
political education--- say, starting with at least the political movements from 17th century 
onwards including major movements in the 20th century and the new social movements of this 
century--- these are not just disruptive moments, but are complex struggles where much political 
learning about freedom takes place. Thus deep democracy will necessarily involve a continuous 
engagement with the past, present and future of the democratic movements in a pluralistic 
context. Periodic individual and mass nonviolent civil disobedience movements will of necessity 
be part of a deep democratic agenda. 
 
Economically, the provision of leisure time for both personal private interest and the 
exercise of citizenship responsibilities will be necessary. Work place democracy is also a salient 
condition, since production is socially necessary and will occupy a certain amount of time for all 
able bodied and mentally competent adults. The capabilities literature has not always been clear 
RQWKLVSRLQW+RZHYHULWLVORJLFDOWRWKLQNWKDWDSHUVRQ¶VFDpabilities will suffer deprivation if 
ZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVGRQRWDOORZGLVFXVVLRQSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQG µRZQHUVKLS¶RIZRUNFRQGLWLRQV
The literature on flat organizations in knowledge economy generally makes a case for the newer 
µLQWHOOHFWXDO¶ ODERU WR EH WUeated in this way; but the social capabilities approach leads to the 
conclusion that all work in organizations large and small should be treated this way so that work 
place alienation can be overcome without necessarily using labor saving capital-intensive 
technologies. 
 
                                                                                                                    
56 see also Kateb (1984). 
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Overcoming alienation also requires a vibrant culture where artistic and other forms of 
individual and collective expressive activities are as open as possible. Capabilities in this 
dimension are vital for the protection of democratic values and practices, since these also involve 
internalization of mutual respect, integrity, tolerance and creativity. It can also be seen that using 
the advances in cognitive, social psychology and some schools of psychoanalysis capabilities can 
be further advDQFHGWKURXJKDWKHUDSHXWLFDSSURDFKWRVRFLDOSUREOHPV$µSRVWPRGHUQ¶LQVLJKWLV
also the need to recognize the limits to certain types of economic growth. As Daly and others 
have pointed out the scale of production counts in a globalized, interdependent planet in a 
significant way. Ecological issues will often require a just global democratic procedure for 
deliberation and policymaking. In short all of the cluster conditions---political, economic and 
cultural--- require a theory of global justice as an underpinning and justification. 
 
Khan (1998) has proposed such a theory in the context of a postmodern world by 
building on elements of Rawls and Sen. In brief outline the structural forces in the global 
economy push towards integrating markets and regions. However, many markets are embedded 
in national economies; there are also non-market aspects of social and cultural lives of people 
that are threatened. As a result we find the contradictory phenomena of McWorld and Jihad 
(Barber, 1995). The creation of a genuine global society, which many see as the ultimate 
outcome of globalization then necessitates meeting the requirements of global justice. Khan 
(1998) mentions at least 5 areas, where the norms of global justice must evolve (among others): 
 
1. International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric system of 
payments which penalizes the deficit countries by forcing only them to bear the 
costs of adjustment needs to be made a global burden sharing institution. The 
World Trade Organization, similarly, needs to acknowledge the historical 
imbalances in the world trading system. For example, specialization according to 
static comparative advantage may lock the developing countries in a relatively 
backward situation in the emerging global division of labor. 
 
2. International capital flows:  From the perspective of many people in the 
GHYHORSHG HFRQRPLHV FDSLWDO IOLJKW WR /'&¶V ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW IUHH WUDGH
agreements) may constitute a barrier to well-being, at least in the short-run. At the 
same time foreign direct investment in Region may create only low-wage, 
marginal jobs (Wood, 1994). A just approach to FDI must consider the effects on 
both the north and south in terms of self-determination. A controlled capital flow 
accompanied by improvements of wages and working conditions in the south may 
be the most desirable solution. 
 
3. International ecological considerations: Global interdependence has been 
increasingly recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what justice demands 
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in terms of the relationship between the north and south. Other things being equal, 
the enforcement of strict environmental standards would seem to be just. 
However, such standards may destroy the livelihood of some people in the south, 
it is sometimes argued. A global tax and transfer scheme would seem to be the 
precondition for applying a global set of environmental standards. The transfer of 
ecologically sound technology systems from rich to the poor countries is a 
precondition for justice in this sphere. 
 
4. Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing discussion 
pinpoints the need for giving people the economic wherewithal in order for them 
to develop their social capabilities. Most studies (e.g., Adelman and Robinson, 
1978; Khan, 1985; James and Khan, 1993) have discovered that non-
redistribution of assets to the poor hampers poverty alleviation strategies. 
Redistributing assets and developing their human capital so that the poor can have 
access to markets becomes a major necessity in our normative framework. In 
most parts of the world this will require structural reforms rather than marginal 
policy interventions. 
 
5. Gender justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be assessed 
carefully. The well-documented facts regarding gender inequalities that so far 
KDYH DIIHFWHG ZRPHQ¶V FDSDELOLWLHV QHJDWLYHO\ GHPDQG XQHTXLYRFDOO\ WKDW
policymakers pay careful attention to enhancing (or at least not decreasing) 
ZRPHQ¶V FDSDELOLWLHV :LOO WKH JOREDOL]DWLRQ KHOS ZRPHQ WR RYHUFRPH VRFLDO
limitations ranging from lack of nutrition to limits on participation in social, 
economic and political life? Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. In so far as 
many developing country women do not possess skills for the global market 
place, globalization is already hurting them. 
 
 These five examples are meant to be illustrative only. By no means do they exhaust all 
the pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For example, we could add or 
highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with globalization and its implications for justice). 
But they do illustrate both the problems and prospects for justice in the age of globalization. One 
of the major political problems we have not discussed so far is the weakening of national 
sovereignty that the call for global economic justice entails. Agreeing to a global mode of 
production and distribution constrained by the principles of justice does mean surrendering 
considerable authority to international agreements, conventions, and ultimately, perhaps to new 
international organizations. It should be observed, however, that even without the constraining 
role of justice the globalization process weakens national sovereignty, even for advanced 
industrialized countries (e.g., NAFTA). Thus, the call for a just economy must confront this (as 
well as other issues such as weakening of traditional cultural modes of living) head on in the 
light of reasonable principles. The fundamental message is that among these principles that of 
freedom as rational autonomy of the individual must be the principal one. This is one rational 
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(perhaps the only one) approach if we are to avoid both the Scylla of Jihad and the Charybdis of 
McWorld. 
  
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real economic, 
financial and technological integration. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
in the early 1970s, the financial market (including interest rates and exchange rates) was 
deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of capital between nations. Until then the world 
financial system was governed by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945 which provided for 
fixed exchange rate where currency values were expressed in terms of dollars and gold. When 
the system was abolished in 1971 by the Nixon administration and replaced by a floating 
exchange rate, the grounds for a global market were laid. 
 
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation that became the "only game in town" following the 
ascendance of political conservatives -- Reagan in the U.S., and Thatcher in Great Britain. It was 
further reinforced by the collapse of the former socialist countries and the emergence of the 
neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged school of thought (Falk, 1997). All these 
factors created a conducive environment for the free movement of goods including capital goods, 
and services as well as finance, thereby seemingly creating an integrated global economy.  will 
show. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: 
 
 $ µ6LPSOH¶ 1RQ-linear Model of Complexity, G rowth, Distr ibution, Capabilities and 
Innovation System Motivated by the Korean Exper ience ---applicable with modification to the 
M E N A economies including Egypt 
  
 In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing complex technological 
systems motivated by the above case study of Korea in particular, we summarize here the basic structure 
RIDµVLPSOH¶QRQ-linear model embodying distinct technological systems which can be applied to analyze 
the technological trajectories in countries like Korea. At any single point in time, the model can be 
presented as a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) representation of the socio-economic system.  The key 
distinction here is the explicitly non-linear nature of the economy-wide functional relationships. The key 
theorem shows the existence of multiple equilibria. Some further considerations of complexity and 
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increasing returns show that multiple equilibria are indeed the natural outcomes in such models. Thus, 
there would seem to be some role for domestic policy in guiding the economy to a particular equilibrium 
among many.  
The capabilities component both at the individual and group level can be modeled by appropriate listing 
RI LQGLYLGXDOV DQG VRFLDO JURXSV 7KH QHWZRUN DVSHFWV RI ³VRFLDO FDSDELOLWLHV´ FDQ EH FDSWXUHG E\ WKH
inclusion of appropriate social, economic and political institutions and their interconnections. The 
economic aspects of income flows and distribution, consumption, saving etc. are relatively easy to capture 
and quantify. Satellite accounts can capture many race, ethnicity and gender related aspects. Much harder 
is the task of capturing social relations. Here, a qualitative network approach is a good starting point, but 
much more remains to be done. 
 The virtue of an economy-wide approach to technology systems is the embodiment of various 
inter-sectoral linkages.  In a SAM, such linkages are mappings from one set of accounts to another. In 
terms of technology systems, the production activities can be broken down into a production (sub-) 
system and a set of innovative activities. In practice, this presents considerable difficulties of 
classification and empirical estimation. 
 
 One major component of the entire innovation system is, of course, the expenditures on R&D.  In 
the SAM for Korea used here, this can appear either as an aggregate expenditure along the column labeled 
R&D, or as a set of disaggregated expenditures.i  In the latter case these may be specified according to 
productive activities (e.g., construction, electrical equipment, etc.) or by institutions (e.g., private R&D 
expenditures, government R&D expenditures, etc.).  It should be emphasized that the dynamic effects of 
R&D on the economy can be captured only in a series of such SAMs over time.  This approach is still at 
the conceptual stage, but appears to be quite appealing.  One can contrast the possible policy experiments 
that can be undertaken within such a framework with the apparently ad hoc science and technology 
policies in many developing countries. In particular, the impact over time of many economic development 
policies including innovation policies can be traced by building and maintaining such SAMs. 
 
 Choice of new technology in a developing country is affected by research and development in at 
least three different ways. Such a country can attempt to develop new technology through R&D, as 
mentioned previously.  This ultimately requires a positive feedback loop innovation system in order to be 
self-sustaining.  Another alternative is to adapt existing technology. This too requires a production system 
geared towards innovation in a limited way. A third alternative is to import technology or to acquire it 
through attracting foreign direct investment. In practice, all these different forms may be combined. The 
abstract model embodies all these different possibilities. However, the first option requires, among other 
things, a presence of multiple equilibria. In a unique equilibrium world the competitive equilibrium 
(under the assumption of complete markets) will always be the most efficient one. The presence of 
increasing returns usually destroys such competitive conditions.  
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 We begin with a number of productive activities reflecting the existing technological structure. 
These activities are defined on the input-output subspace of the general and abstract mathematical space 
X. In addition to the values of inputs and outputs, points in this space could also represent household and 
other institutional income and expenditure accounts. We also incorporate the possibility of R&D as a 
separate productive activity. Formally, it is always possible to break R&D down into as many finite 
components as we want. The key relationship in this context is that between the endogenous accounts 
(usually, production activities and technologies, factors and households) and the exogenous ones.  It is 
this relationship that is posited to be non-linear and this together with some assumptions on the relevant 
mathematical space can lead to the existence of multiple equilibria. 
  
Although the existence theorems for these multisectoral models provide some structure for the equilibria 
as sequences of fixed points in the socio-economic structure with evolving technology systems, it is not 
specified a priori which equilibrium will be reached. The problem of equilibrium selection thus remains 
open. The idea behind a POLIS can now be stated somewhat more formally. It is to reach a sequence of 
equilibria so that in the non-linear models of the entire economy the maximal fixed points that are 
attainable are in fact reached through a combination of market forces and policy maneuvers over time. It 
is also to be understood that path-dependence of technology would rule out certain equilibria in the future. 
Thus initial choices of technologies can matter crucially at times. 
 
 The Model on a Lattice 
 
 Define X  as a vector lattice over a subring M  of the real field R .Let ^ `0,| t  xXxxx  
A non-linear mapping N  is defined such that 0,: 0  o  NXXN .  Given a vector of exogenous 
variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a simultaneous non-linear equations model of an 
economy, :E  
dNxx             (1) 
for a given  Xd . 
This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described previously.  In order to 
specify the model further, the following assumptions are necessary.  
1. X  is order complete 
2. N  is an isotone mapping 
3.   xÖ  such that dxNx t ÖÖ  
In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of inputs to the space of 
the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical progress over time. The 3 assumptions 
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are minimally necessary for the existence of equilibrium. Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is 
some level of output vector which can be produced given the technical production conditions and demand 
structure. 
 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria:  
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists  Xx*  so that *x  is a solution of  
dNxx   
 Proof: Consider the interval > @ ^ `xxXxxx dd  Ö0,Ö|Ö,0  where xÖ  is defined as in assumption 3.  
Take a mapping F . 
dNxXxF o :  
F  is isotone and maps > @x,0  into itself. 
Define a set > @^ `FxxxxxD t{ ,,0 . 
By assumption 3, D  is non-empty. 
We now show Dx inf* {  is a solution to dNxx  . Dx inf* { ; therefore Dxxx d ,* . F  is 
isotone; therefore xFxFx dd*  for each Dx  implying. 
 ** xFx d  
From (2) we have   ** FxFxF d . Thus DFx * ; hence ** inf FxDx d{  so, *** FxxFx dd . 
Therefore ** Fxx  . 
7KLV LV DQ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI 7DUVNL¶V DQG %LUNKRII¶V WKHRUHP  7KH NH\ IHDWXUH WR QRWH KHUH LV WKDW WKH
equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted that under additional assumptions on space 
X  and the mapping N  the computation of a fixed point can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega 
and Rheinboldt). A similar model can be constructed on Banach space as well. 
 
Needless to say, any formalization of a complex system leaves out certain features. For example, 
the political features of POLIS are captured only indirectly and inferentially in the above model. But at 
least the ecological and distributive features can be captured by constructing the appropriate 
environmentally-sensitive SAMs and applying the model over time for a country like Korea. What the 
above verbal argument and formal exercise suggest is the feasibility of an alternative developmental 
model that builds upon some of the insights of the Asian success stories like Korea but also can take some 
necessary steps to face the ecological and political economic challenges of the 21st  century. 
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Appendix 3: The Augmented National Innovation Systems and Capabilities approach and a more 
complex illustrative model 
 
 
 Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space for an Augmented National Innovation Systems 
model :   
 
 In this section the results for multiple equilibria presented verbally in the main text and formally 
in appendix 1 are further extended to functionals on Banach Space. We can define the model 
presented in appendix 1 again for monotone iterations, this time on a non-empty subset of an ordered 
Banach space X . The mapping XXf o:  is called compact if it is continuous and if  xf  is 
relatively compact.  The map f  is called completely continuous if f  is continuous and maps 
bounded subsets of X  into compact sets.  Let X  be a non-empty subset of some ordered set Y .  A 
fixed point x  of a map XXN o: is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y  of N  in X  
satisfies 
  xyyx dd  
Theorem: Let  PE , be an ordered Banach space and let D  be a subset of E .   
Suppose that EDf o:  is an increasing map which is compact on every order interval in D . If there 
exist ,y  DyÖ with yy Öd  such that  yfy d and   yyf ÖÖ d , then f  has a minimal fixed point x .  
Moreover, yx d  and  yFx klim . That is, the minimal fixed point can be computed iteratively by 
means of the iteration scheme 
 yx  0  
  kk xfx  1   ,....2,1,0 k  
Moreover, the sequence  kx  is increasing. 
Proof: Since f  is increasing, the hypotheses imply that f  maps the order interval > @yy,  into itself.  
Consequently, the sequence  kx  is well-defined and, since it is contained in > @yyf , , it is relatively 
compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  By induction, it is easily seen that the sequence  kx  is 
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increasing.  This implies that it has exactly one limit point x  and that the whole sequence converges to 
x . Since g is continuous, x  is a fixed point of f .  If x  is an arbitrary fixed point in D  such that 
yx t , then, by replacing y  by x  in the above argument, it follows that xx d . Hence x  is the 
minimal fixed point of f  in   DPy  .  It should be observed that we do not claim that there exists a 
minimal fixed point of f  in D . 
We can also show that if dNxXxF o :  is an intersecting compact map in a non-empty 
order interval  > @xx Ö,  and Fxx d  and xxF ÖÖ d  then F  has a minimal fixed point *x  and a maximal 
fixed point **x .  Moreover,  xFx klim*   and  xFx k Ölim**  . The first of the above sequences is 
increasing and the second is decreasing. 
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Appendix 4: On C reating a Deep Democratic Movement in M E N A Region 
 
The main purpose here is to propose a somewhat novel theory of deep democracy from a political and 
social economy perspective which can serve as an analytical framework for setting an important part of 
the agenda for a movement towards such substantive democracy in the MENA region.For setting a 
practical agenda in the region, the cluster conditions in table 1 below and the subsequent discussion of 
clusters of political, economic and other conditions for deepening democratic capabilities in a network of 
appropriate institutions can be used. 
  In deep democracy, democratic practices have to become institutionalized in such a way that they 
become SDUWRIQRUPDOOLIHLQDGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\2QWRORJLFDOO\GHHSGHPRFUDF\RYHUODSVZLWK%DUEHU¶V
(1984) idea of strong democracy. There are, however, epistemological differences as well as differences 
of emphasis, particularly in the economic sphere. Cluster conditions for deep democracy include both 
cultural-political and socio-economic conditions.  
 
Our theory of deep democracy also fields skeptical challenges of postmodern philosophers. However, we 
restrict our discussion to matters as they relate to the moral agency of the democratic actors while 
developing the idea of moving towards deep democracy in the context of important failures of both 
capitalism and socialism in the last century (Frame, 2007; Khan, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007). We begin by 
discussing the meaning of the political and social economy approach as we use this term. Next, we 
discuss in greater detail the economic and political dimensions of deep democracy. Finally, we take up the 
crucial task of defending the subjectivity of a deeply democratic individual. Conclusions follow. 
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The political and social economy approach 
 
Table-1 
C luster conditions for deep democracy 
No. Condition No. Condition 
01 
Ending of economic and other status 
inequalities; 
13 
Public funding of issue-oriented 
committees as well as parties; 
02 
Public emphasis on furthering 
democratic autonomy, inter-
nationalism, and individuality; 
14 
Takeover of some security and civil 
judicial functions by neighborhood or 
regional democratic associations; 
abolition of centralized, especially 
secret police powers and units; 
03 
Adequate incomes for all socially 
recognized work, as well as for 
children, the handicapped, the aged, and 
others not able to work in order to 
promote equality of capability; 15 
Universal public service, military or 
community; restructuring of armed 
forces in a defensive, civilian-oriented 
direction; removal of authoritarianism 
of rank and status, and institution of 
democratic unit organization, allowing 
serious discussion of policy; 04 
Respect for and articulation of 
differences in public life and within 
parties; 
05 
Downward democratic congruence of 
and within ordinary social institutions, 
including work place democracy; 
16 Proportional representation of parties; 
06 
Debate over the history and future of 
the movement- the nature of deep 
democracy ± in neighborhood 
assemblies and schools; 
17 Abolition of patriarchy; 
07 
Cultivation of respect for civil 
disobedience, strikes, and other acts of 
protest on major public issues; 
18 
Adoption of democratic child-rearing 
practices; 
 
08 
Integration of local and national leaders 
into features of ordinary economic and 
political life and creation of arenas for 
criticism; 
19 
Full freedom of social intercourse of 
diverse groups; 
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09 
Curtailment of all direct political 
intervention in the arts, religion, and 
personal life; 
20 
Full freedom of diverse cultural 
expression; 
10 
Establishment of independent judicial, 
policy, communication and electoral 
review bodies; 
21 
Encouragement of the arts and varying 
modes of expression so that every 
individual can experience and struggle 
with the challenge of non-dominating 
discourse; 
11 
Diversity of perspective in 
communications and education; 
22 
Practice of radical forms of individual 
and group subjectivity leading to what 
Guattari has termed the molecular 
revolution; 
12 
Use of differential, serial referenda on 
central issues; 
23 
Adoption of technology and innovation 
systems, which will reinforce the 
conditions above, rather than 
undercutting them. 
Source: Khan (1998: 101). 
 
By political economy we mean the classical state and civil society and its interactions. By social 
economy we mean the underlying social basis of the political economy including the family 
structure. Khan (1994, 1998, 2007) presents deep democracy as a structure in addition to formal 
democratic apparatus, such that the practice of democratic life can be reproduced with the basic 
values intact. Change is not precluded. But all such changes should deepen democracy, not 
weaken it. Deep democracy in this sense is intimately connected with economic and social 
justice. In order to make economic justice tenable, however, at least a cluster of conditions 
connected with deepening democracy must be realized (Khan 1994, 1998). Table-1 lists such 
cluster conditions. 
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Table-2 
Summary of social capabilities* 
No. Condition No. Condition 
01 
Being able to live to the end of a 
complete human life, as far as possible. 
15 
Being able to live for and to others, to 
recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various 
forms of familial and social interaction. 02 Being able to be courageous. 
03 
Being able to have opportunities for 
sexual satisfaction. 
16 Being capable of friendship. 
04 Being able to move from place to place. 17 
Being able to visit and entertain friends. 
 
05 
Being able to avoid unnecessary and 
non-useful pain and to have pleasurable 
experiences. 
18 
Being able to participate in the 
community. 
06 Being able to use the five senses. 19 
Being able to participate politically and 
being capable of justice. 
07 Being able to imagine. 20 
Being able to live with concern for and 
in relation to animals, plants and the 
world of nature. 
08 Being able to think and reason. 21 
Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy 
recreational activities. 
09 Being acceptably well-informed. 22 
%HLQJDEOHWROLYHRQH¶VRZQOLIHDQG
QRERG\HOVH¶V 
10 
Being able to have attachments to things 
and persons outside ourselves. 
23 
%HLQJDEOHWROLYHLQRQH¶VYHU\RZQ
surroundings and context. 
11 
Being able to love, grieve, to feel 
longing and gratitude. 
24 Capability to have self-respect. 
12 
Being able to form a conception of the 
good. 
25 
Capability to appear in public without 
shame. 
13 
Capability to choose; ability to form 
goals, commitments, values. 
26 
Capability to live a rich and fully 
human life, up to the limit permitted by 
natural possibilities. 
14 
Being able to engage in critical 
UHIOHFWLRQDERXWWKHSODQQLQJRIRQH¶V
own life. 
27 
Ability to achieve valuable 
functionings. 
Source: Sen & Nussbaum, as cited by Khan (1998: 95). 
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*Here the controversies regarding listing should be kept in mind. But this list without being definitive can 
nevertheless offer some guidance regarding the kinds of capabilities that are necessary for a deeply democratic 
society in MENA region keeping in mind the history and cultural specificities of the region as well.  
 
It may be useful to elaborate upon the idea of social capabilities. We have summarized a list in Table-2, 
following Sen & Nussbaum (1993) However, we have tried to give a fully social interpretation of all the 
capabilities as in Khan (1998). Having summarized our approach to deep democracy from the political and 
social economy perspective, we now turn to the crucial problem of deepening democracy as a set of practices 
over time. 
 
Towards a deeply democratic society in the MENA Region 
 
The aim of any sane, progressive socio-economic system must go beyond the blind accumulation of 
capital or development at all costs. The goal of a just political and social economy is to guarantee each 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VIUHHGRPRUDELOLW\WROLYHWKHNLQGRIOLIHKHVKHFKRRVHVCapabilities can be construed as the 
general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, maintained, nurtured and developed.1 
Capabilities are economic, but they are also political, social, psychological, and spiritual.  
 
A deeply democratic society must take into account all forms of capabilities without the sacrifice of some 
over others. Further, no one capability can be substituted for another. All are irreducible. As Frame (2007) 
illustrates, there are significant challenges to this aim under the capitalist system. For all members of a 
VRFLHW\WRGHYHORSIUHHO\DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDELOLWLHVFDQQRWLQIULQJHXSRQWKHFDSDELOLWLHVRIDQRWKHU$Q\
form of exploitation in VRFLHW\ QRPDWWHU KRZ OHJDOO\ FRQVWUXHG VKRXOG LQIULQJH XSRQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
freedom. In addition, radical change without actual participation is impossible.  
 
Economic preconditions for deep democracy: For a deeply democratic society to exist, it must contain 
political and social conditions that foster the full development of individual capabilities. It must also 
contain economic conditions that provide the material base for egalitarian political and social 
participation as well as physical and psychological health. In economic systems that promote or sanction 
significant inequalities and/or alienating divisions of labor, deep democracy is impossible. Proponents of 
deep democracy must examine, therefore, which specific values and institutions within an economic 
framework would support or hinder democratic practices from taking root and flourishing.  
 
We will first consider the principal values upon which an economic system conducive to deep democracy 
must strive to adhere to and second, possible institutional changes that would abet the concrete realization 
of a deep democratic society. Can the economic ever be ranked before social? Such a fundamental 
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question must be addressed if a humane economic system is to be constructed which is not merely 
sustained by the blind drive to accumulate, as in capitalism, or develop without regard to social relations, 
as in more vulgar forms of economic determinism.  
 
Sen (2000) argues that in contrast to the utilitarian approach of maximizing GDP growth, the fundamental 
goal should be the development of substantive freedoms ± capabilities ± to choose a life one has reason to 
value. Thus, the aim of economic growth should be to enhance the freedom of the individual to choose the 
kind of life he/she desires. The question that needs further examination is: precisely what values must 
drive, shape, and ultimately determine an economic system so that the full capabilities of each individual 
are developed? What values must be given primary consideration so that the system itself does not 
perpetuate a feedback loop in which inequality, hierarchy, and eventually exploitation and alienation 
come to dominate? 
 
Albert & Hahnel (1991) suggest the evaluation of economic institutions based upon five moral and logical 
criteria: equity, efficiency, self-management, solidarity, and variety. To this list, we add transparency in 
dealings with all those affected in respect of full social (and ecological) costs of every economic 
transaction. Capability deprivation can only be eliminated if the economic system is fundamentally 
equitable. Albert & Hahnel (1991) chose to define equity as based upon effort alone rather than 
accumulated private property or fortuitous individual talents. Gilbert (1990) suggests equal incomes for 
all socially recognized work.  
 
The capabilities enhancing viewpoint might maintain, in slight contrast, that equity is desirable only to the 
H[WHQW WKDWLWIXOILOOV WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\ WRSDUWDNHVRFLDOO\RQHTXDO IRRWLQJZLWKRWKHUPHPEHUVRI
society. Such a viewpoint might break with the maxim equal pay for equal effort; in the case of the 
physically ill or mentally handicapped, for example, greater pay above the effort expended may be 
necessary. In any case, it would seem that the most vital components of equity would be the elimination 
of surplus value extraction and compensation for the disadvantaged. This would include the elimination 
of all forms of surplus-value extraction currently found under the wage labor system of capitalism.  
 
An economic system that eliminates the extraction of surplus value would greatly abet abolishing 
exploitation and hierarchy, and to some extent, class disadvantages. The increasing self-management of 
workers would further erode hierarchy, division of labor, and class, as all members would gain experience 
in organizing and decision-making. Through self-management alone can the dilemma of alienation in 
either hierarchal capitalist systems or top-down command structures of centralized planning be alleviated.  
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,I ZH FRQVLGHU 6HQ¶V  FDSDELOLties approach, which advocates the freedom to choose a work 
environment suitable to individual needs, it is hardly likely that any individual would choose less self-
management over increased self-management. If the goal of deep democracy is indeed capabilities 
enhancement, the development of freedom and choice must not be excluded from the sphere of work. 
Solidarity through team effort, rather than competitiveness, is also crucial in the return of the individual to 
his/her social essence as envisioned by Marx and overcoming the alienation of species-being where 
economic transactions are a zero-sum game.  
 
Work as a variety of tasks rather than repetition would help develop and unite the currently disparate 
emotional, physical, mental and spiritual aspects of the individual. Through a variety of tasks the 
breakdown of the invidious division between manual and mental labor, which centralizes authority within 
the hands of the elite, could be eroded. Finally, a transparent, eco-friendly economic system that allows 
citizens full awareness of the social and environmental costs of economic transactions within that system 
is vital to full citizen participation and decision-making. 
 
Is such a seemingly utopian economic system possible? Numerous authors have written on alternative 
economic systems. Khan (1998) suggests furthering democratic practices through citizen participation in 
oversight, design, governance, and evaluation processes of technological development; in a deep 
democratic society, research and development expenditures, for example, be publicly debated, and some 
asset redistribution so that the poor can have access to markets would be necessary. Albert & Hahnel 
(1991) explored the theoretical feasibility of creating highly decentralized democratic economic model 
with a radically different system of production, consumption, and allocation.  
 
The participants in the planning process are worker councils and federations, consumer councils and 
federations, and an Iteration Facilitation Board (IFB). The IFB announces indicative prices for all final 
goods/services, capital goods, natural resources, and categories of labor. Consumer councils and 
federations respond with consumption proposals. Worker councils and federations respond with 
production proposals listing the outputs they propose and the inputs they need to make them. The IFB 
then calculates the excess demand or supply for each input and output and adjusts the indicative price up 
or down. Using the new indicative prices, consumer and worker councils and federations revise and 
resubmit their proposals until other councils accept them.  
 
The economic processes of production, consumption and allocation are determined by production, 
consumer, and IFB councils, reaching from the micro-level of the workplace, the meso-level of the 
community, to the macro-level of the nation. Democratic participation in all the councils is carefully 
UHJXODWHG (TXDO VWDWXV LQKLELWV FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ RI SRZHU ZKLFK RFFXUV LQ FHQWUDO SODQQLQJ :RUNHUV¶
councils allow for democratic deliberation, and self-management. Solidarity is promoted through 
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cooperation in decision-making and non-hierarchal positions in the workplace, while variety of tasks 
circumvents the ossification of traditional divisions of labor and hierarchy.  
 
Concerning equLW\$OEHUW	+DKQHO¶VHFRQRPLFPRGHOVWULNHVDWDYHU\FHQWUDOLVVXH&DQPRQH\
as an exchange system remain as capital and not promote competitiveness, acquisitiveness, and 
exploitation? Equity, in the radical economic model, is insured through payment for effort, which is 
ultimately no more than equal exchange through effort for consumption goods as opposed to capital 
accumulation. However, the real problem is to go beyond treating labor power as a commodity. In terms 
of value theory, we need to go beyond the value form itself. This requires going beyond what Marx calls 
bourgeois rights (Khan, 2006). This would indeed call for a radical restructuring of the current economic 
system.  
 
Political preconditions for deep democracy: Rights that enhance the ability of each individual to 
participate politically, equally and fully constitute a vital component of a deeply democratic society. The 
extent to which political rights are relevant can be argued from a variety of perspectives. From the 
Marxist perspective, political rights are reflective of the extent to which citizens are not alienated from the 
political processes. Our theory of deep democracy does not separate political processes from all other 
forms of power (social, economic, or ideological) in society.  
 
Deep democracy criticizes the divisive characteristic of the state. Although citizen created, the state 
dominates its creators. Individuals have no direct control over the instruments they are being governed by. 
The processes of legislating, administering, and governing are often beyond the reach of the average 
citizen. Hence, with the increasing power of the state, alien forces increasingly govern public life of the 
individual. Hence, political rights must be given priority.  
 
Barber argues for political rights from a somewhat different but no less important vantage point. He 
criticizes liberal democracy as inherently limited in its conception of both the individual and the social 
contract between individual and state. The individual in liberal theRU\LVQRPRUHWKDQ³«DFUHDWXUHRI
DSSHWLWH RU RI UHDVRQ LQGHQWXUHG WR DSSHWLWH« LQFDSDEOHRI EHDULQJ WKHZHLJKW RI KLV LGHDOV´ %DUEHU
2003). The role of the state in liberal democracy, Barber claims, is no more than that of a zookeeper.  
 
The conundrum which liberal democracy finds itself unable to resolve is the tension between the freedom 
of the individual and the power of the state. The state, a necessary apparatus to protect the freedom of the 
individual, ends up usurping the freedom of the individual itself. This dilemma arises because liberal 
GHPRFUDF\GRHVQRWWUXO\UHJDUGWKHFLWL]HQ¶VUROHDVDSDUWLFLSDWRU\RQHKHQFHWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH
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state as usurper of the FLWL]HQ¶VQDWXUDOIUHHGRPDULVHV2QO\DSROLWLFDOV\VWHPµZLWKDFLYLFFXlture 
nearer to the themes of participation, citizenship, and political activity¶ %DUEHU  UHPHGLHV
political alienation and apathy found in formal democracies.  
 
From the developmental and capabilities approach, Sen offers three different perspectives as to why 
political rights are necessary. First, political rights are inalienable rights. Self-determination, liberty, and 
democracy are capabilities to be developed as any other. Second, the instrumental role of political rights 
is crucial in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing their political and economic needs. Last, 
political rights are necessary in the constructive role that they play in the conceptualization of needs in a 
social context. Public debate, discussion, and the civil liberties to engage in them shape how people 
conceptualize their own needs. (Sen, 2000).  
 
The question which one must engage with then is not so much whether or not political rights are 
necessary. The question, then, is what hinders political rights as capabilities, whether it is the capability to 
engage politically on equal footing as another member of society, or the capability to engage in a political 
setting which fosters self-governance, fellowship of civic association, or mutual deliberation, decision and 
work (Barber, 2003).  
 
Progress in this direction, like the question of economic capabilities, must consider the complex issue of 
political alienation which arises, as radicals note, from the disparate capabilities of individuals caught in a 
class based society. In the call for liberty and democracy, the difference between formal rights, which are 
possessed by both the poor and the rich, and effective rights, which are profoundly affected by hierarchy, 
division of labor, economic inequality, political elitism, cannot simply be ignored. In addition to the 
social and economic structures that hinder the political rights of individuals, deeply democratic societies 
must evaluate the institutional structures of formal democracy and critique their effectiveness in providing 
real political capabilities to citizens.  
 
As Barber (2003) argues, liberal democracy is too limited both in its concept of the individual, and lacks 
the necessary political institutions for truly participatory democratic processes. A deeply democratic 
society must strive to implement concrete institutions that promote democracy. Accountable institutions 
of representation and leadership, participatory political processes enjoined by a highly informed citizenry, 
and progressive legislation are three areas of focus here.  
 
A deeply democratic society seeks to enhance the political capabilities of each citizen in respect to self-
governance, freedom, equality, and justice. Certain features of formal democracy appear unable to fully 
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provide political capabilities to citizens. The first feature that stands out prominently is the issue of 
representation. In cases of small communities, direct democracy may allow for equal representation and 
participation of each citizen; however, large regimes or nation-states necessitate some form of political 
representation. Yet formal democracy, or representative democracy, can be criticized as the political rule 
of electorally chosen elites, who are often biased with partisan interests.  
 
Benjamin Barber criticizes thH FRQFHSW RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LWVHOI DV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ IODZHG µ«PHQ DQG
women who are not directly responsible through common deliberation, common decision, and common 
DFWLRQIRUSROLFLHVWKDWGHWHUPLQHWKHLUFRPPRQOLYHVDUHQRWUHDOO\IUHHDWDOO«FLWL]HQs become subjects 
to laws they do not truly participate in making; they become the passive constituents of representatives 
ZKRIDUIURPUHFRQVWLWXWLQJWKHFLWL]HQV¶DLPVDQGLQWHUHVWVXVXUSWKHLUFLYLFIXQFWLRQVDQGGHIOHFWWKHLU
FLYLFHQHUJLHV¶%DUEHU2003). To a great deal this can be attributed to the problem of class and economic 
inequalities.  
 
With a more equitable socio-economic system, such as the participatory economic system envisioned by 
Hahnel and Albert, which decentralizes economic decision making and checks the usurpation of resources 
by elites, the partisan interest of politicians representing class-bias and political alienation of ordinary 
citizens would be greatly reduced. However, some institutional changes to formal democracy would be 
necessary that would limit the purely political power of representatives and leaders.  
 
Gilbert recommends institutionalized possibilities of recall, criticism, and restriction on pay of 
representatives (Gilbert, 1990).  Representatives at the local, state, and national level could be subject to 
public evaluation and/or criticism and in cases of transgressions recall, allowing for greater 
accountability. Restrictions on pay comparable to salaries of other workers (in a society wherein roughly 
equal incomes are the norm) would discourage individuals from political involvement for monetary gains. 
,QDGGLWLRQPHDVXUHVWDNHQWRJXDUGDJDLQVWWKHJURZWKRIDµSROLWLFDOHOLWH¶± wherein certain individuals 
become professional politicians for life and can thereby manipulate political power for their particularistic 
interests ± would be necessary.  
 
6XFKPHDVXUHVZRXOGLQFOXGHDOLPLWWRRQH¶VWLPHLQRIILFHDQGDOLPLWWRRQH¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQSROLWLFV
overall. Additional measures might have to be implemented to avoid the development of political familial 
dynasties. The establishment of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral review bodies 
would maintain a system of checks and balances. To check the monopoly of one or two powerful parties, 
Gilbert (1990) also recommends proportional representation of parties in accordance with the percentage 
by which the party is elected. 
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Beyond institutional checks and balances of representatives, a deeply democratic society must be as 
highly decentralized as possible. This would entail both a highly informed, active citizenry combined with 
institutions that delegate decision-PDNLQJSRZHUGLUHFWO\ LQWR WKHKDQGVRI WKHSHRSOH%DUEHU¶V 
strong democracy advocates unmediated self-governance through local, state, and national institutions 
that allow for discussion, decision-making and action at all three levels. At the local level, Barber (2003) 
recommends a national system of neighborhood assemblies of from one to five thousand citizens with 
deliberative eventually local legislative competence as well as selective local elections to local office by 
lottery with pay initiatives. At the national level, he recommends a national initiative and referendum 
process that permits popular initiatives and referenda on congressional legislation.  
 
In contrast to current trends of political apathy, self-governance would call for a highly informed 
citizenry. Barber (2003) recommends such programs as a civic videotext service and civic educational 
postal act that would promote full civic education, and a program of universal citizen service. Khan 
(1998,2007) and Gilbert (1990) call for the establishment of a universal public service that would involve 
either military or community service. Similar to the democratic, civilian based ideals of the Chinese 
3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\SUDFWLFHGGXULQJWKH&KLQHVH5HYROXWLRQ.KDQDQG*LOEHUWFDOO
IRUWKHUHVWUXFWXULQJRIDUPHGIRUFHVLQDµGHIHQVLYHFLYLOLDQ-RULHQWHGGLUHFWLRQ¶DORQJZLWKWKHµUHPRYDO
of authoritarianism of rank and status, and institution of democratic unit organization, allowing serious 
GLVFXVVLRQRISROLF\¶.KDQ 
 
In addition, deeply democratic governance would necessitate abolishing of all centralized, secret police 
powers and units as well as secret military interventions in foreign governments. Deep democracy, and 
the possibility of internationalism and solidarity, cannot exist when many foreign policies, some of a 
more nefarious nature, are regulated to elite decisions, as in the case of the U.S.A., when many foreign 
military interventions circumvent both congressional and public oversight (Johnson, 2004). The appendix 
RIIHUVDIXOOUHSULVHRI%DUEHU¶VVWURQJGHPRFUDWLFSURJUDPIRUUHYLWDOL]LQJFLWL]HQVKLS 
 
Finally, the adoption of progressive legislation similar to the U.N. Charter on Human rights that calls for 
both the protection of individual rights as well as the explicit rights of women, minorities, or other 
disadvantaged groups would ensure, beyond deeply democratic decentralized deliberation, a standard of 
human rights. Even if a decision settled through democratic deliberation, it must be invalidated in cases 
where that decision oppresses particular groups in society, or upholds exploitative norms. A deeply 
democratic society in all cases must seek to uphold the equal economic and political rights of all citizens. 
 
Social capabilities: Beyond economic and political preconditions, for a deep democratic society to be 
both sustainable and fully human, we need to question more deeply the meaning of well-being. The 
GHYHORSPHQW RI µVRFLDO FDSDELOLWLHV¶ LV QR OHVV FUXFLDO EXW SHUKDSV PRUH GLIILFXOW WR GHILQH 6RFLDO
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capabilities are capabilities that can only be developed in relation to others. They consist of positive 
relations to other members of society as well as a healthy relationship to oneself. Sen & Nussbaum (1992) 
list the capabilities to think and reason, to imagine, to be able to form a conception of the good, to be 
capable of having self-respect, to be able to participate in a community, among others.  
 
If we conceive of social possibilities in the context of legislation, Khan includes as part of the set of 
cluster conditions for a deeply democratic society the abolition of patriarchy, the adoption of democratic 
child-rearing practices, the full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups, and the full freedom of 
diverse cultural expression (Khan 1998). A progressive legislation that ensures these basic rights would 
be the first step for the establishment of social capabilities. 
 
Beyond progressive legislation, truly deep democracy would call for a breakdown of the monopoly of 
intellectual, artistic, scientific, and spiritual elitism. It is as impossible to judge scientifically, given this 
historical elitism, the extent to which the majority are capable of developing in these areas as it would 
have been to determine the intellectual/spiritual potential of women two hundred years ago under 
patriarchy. The bias of class based societies towards these social capabilities has pervaded social norms to 
such a profound extent that only an elite few are able, or even believe they are able, to develop in any of 
these areas.  
 
The elite produce art and culture, the many simply consume it. At the same time, overwhelmingly art and 
culture portray a lifestyle and culture alien and inaccessible to lower classes. Science or other intellectual 
endeavors are equally inaccessible to the majority both due to the gulf between mental and manual labor, 
as well as the price of education. It may be argued that under the current capitalist society education is 
more widespread and accessible than ever before. Yet this, too, comes at a price. As already discussed 
extensively under the section on alienation, in a consumerist society, even the limited artistic, scientific, 
LQWHOOHFWXDO DQG VSLULWXDO ILHOGV DUH FRPPRGLILHG LQIULQJLQJ XSRQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V DELOLW\ WR SHUFHLYH
anything without a price.  
 
A deeply democratic society would both have to disentangle the elitism which typically surrounds these 
areas as well as distance material means from the decision to participate or not in these areas. This could 
be done by free, accessible, lifelong adult education with the reduced working hours available under 
participatory economics.  
 
Within social institutions such as education, greater democratic practices are also necessary. Alternative 
systems of education have experimented with such practices with considerable success. Education centers 
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built upon the philosophy of the Indian thinker Krishnamurti attest to this. His educational philosophy 
protests against the typical use of reward/punishment, competition and fear and hierarchy which, 
according to him, condition the individual so deeply that real self-discovery, questioning, and creative 
thought is impossible. Instead, more emphasis is placed upon self-inquiry around such vital life questions 
as: Why do we fear? Why do we feel the need for power? What is love? Only by such expansive 
questioning free from authority, Krishnamurti, maintains, can we become whole human beings. Only 
through understanding of issues such as the ego and separateness can the deeper aspects of the human 
psyche be developed healthily.  
 
Democratic practices within the educational system could be expanded to include more spiritual 
institutions with similar democratic practices of non-elitism and non-hierarchy, and full participation in 
both thinking and interpreting spiritual script. ,PSRUWDQW VWXGLHV E\ )UDQNO  UHYHDO WKDW µZLOO WR
PHDQLQJ¶ WKHDELOLW\ WRILQGPHDQLQJ LQRQH¶V OLIH LVDQHVsential necessity to living. The capability to 
GLVFRYHURQH¶VµZLOOWRPHDQLQJ¶LVDQLUUHGXFLEOHVRFLDOFDSDELOLW\DVPXFKDVSURSHUFORWKLQJRr political 
participation. Logotherapy helps patients find meaning in any given situation in their life, even in 
suffering. Therapy such as logo therapy, along with community, spiritual support and deeper education, 
would help provide members of a deeply democratic society with the psychological wherewithal to 
possess this capability.  
 
:KLOH )UDQNO¶V  ORJRtherapy is primarily individualistic, Khan (1998) recommends continuous 
therapy available for all members of a deeply democratic society, which would include forms of group 
therapy. This would be an affirmation of the necessity of social healing in class based societies where 
disparate groups are, by and large, alienated from one another. Most importantly, this could allow the 
development of empathy between individuals from disparate backgrounds. The point here is not to 
emphasize one form of education or social institution above all others, but to draw attention to the variety 
of alternative institutions that could help to positively develop the social capabilities of members in a deep 
democratic society. 
 
The problem of moral agency in creating social capababilities for deep democracy 
 
If indeed there were no real subjectivity for humans, as many postmodernists have claimed, then the task 
of theorizing about deep democracy and economic justice would seem completely hopeless. This is really 
the problem of agency or ± as it is well known in the French postmodernist and poststructuralist circles ±
WKH SUREOHP RI WKH VXEMHFW ,Q )UDQFH LW ZDV PDGH SRSXODU E\ $OWKXVVHU¶V GLVFXVVLRQV RI LGHRORJ\2 
However, the deeper philosophical and psychoanalytic motivations for considering the subject 
SUREOHPDWLF KDYH EHHQ DUWLFXODWHG E\ /DFDQ  ,Q /DFDQ¶V  YLHZ WKH VXEMHFW KDV ERWK
conscious and unconscious motivations. The unconscious part is the source of the problem.  
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Lacan (1975) claims that the structure of the unconscious is the same as the structure of repressed. This 
FKDLQRIUHSUHVVHGVLJQLILHUVKLGHVWKHDFWXDOLQFRKHUHQFHRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VVXEMHFWLYLW\However, the leap 
from a nuanced analysis of the unconscious aspects of the psyche to the conclusion that there is no subject 
with a moral capacity for action is illegitimate for several reasons.3 First, the idea of a subject can have a 
limited warrant even if the unconscious motivations are discerned as contradictory. The potential for 
moral capacity of such a subject is weaker. Nevertheless, even weakly constituted, quasi-juridical subjects 
can serve as putative agents of moral actions.  
 
7KHVHFRQGDQGPRUHLPSRUWDQWREMHFWLRQWRWKH/DFDQLDQIDOODF\LVWKDW/DFDQ¶VSRVLWLRQFDQDFWXDOO\EH
used to reformulate the view of a subject effectively. Recognizing the inevitable unconscious 
contradictions allows one to distinguish between two kinds of subjecthood in a dynamic sense.4 On the 
one hand we have the (relatively) unaware subject who is the ideologically constructed individual. Such a 
person may be shored up by all the reassuring dogmas and ideologies of our contemporary society. The 
crack in the mirror where such a person observes himself is invisible as long as he is ignorant of his own 
inner turmoil at the conscious level. This is not to say that archaic thought-processes or emotions do not 
invade the person from time to time.  
 
Cohen (1994) argues that a trained analyst can perceive both the moral capacities and moral failures of 
subjects. Conceptually, the argument simply establishes the possibility of the subjecthood of a person. 
The precise content of the subjectivity may indeed be unhealthy in a clinical sense. But such 
characterization only reestablishes the moral potential of the person as an agent. Denying this potential is 
itself an act of ideological repression.  
 
Such considerations lead us to think of a second type of moral agent. This is a subject whose awareness 
has unfolded to such an extent that he/she is able to conceive of himself/herself as a moral agent. 
However, such awareness also encompasses the repression that accompanies our insertion into the 
symbolic. Thus his/her moral insights about himself/herself and the world also include a recognition of 
human vulnerability, epistemic shortcomings and the need for a twofold dialogue. This dialogue is, on the 
one hand, a conversation within oneself5 and, on the other, a dialogue with the outside world.  
 
Depending on the state of the individual psychoanalytic therapy may or may not be necessary for such 
subjectivity to occur. However, Khan has argued elsewhere (Khan, 1992, 1993a,b; 1995), in a just and 
democratic society, the resources for such therapy will be available to all. Here a further source of 
confusion may arise. There is a widespread view both within and outside of psychoanalysis that analysis 
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µVKULQNV WKH UHDOP RI WKHPRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶$V 6KHUPDQ SXWV LW µWKHUH LV WKH VXUIDFH SDUDGR[ WKDW
while morality is ubiquitous, the clinical hour boasts of time and space that is morally neuWUDO«¶S 
 
But as Wallwork (1991) has argued, psychoanalysis is uncompromisingly situated within an ethical 
SHUVSHFWLYH6KHUPDQIROORZVDQGGHYHORSV$ULVWRWOH¶VFULWLTXHRIWKH6RFUDWLFGHQLDOWKDWRQHFDQNQRZ
what is good and fail to act on it. AriVWRWOHRIFRXUVHFODLPHGWKDW6RFUDWHV¶GHQLDORIakrasia was simply 
µDJDLQVW WKH SODLQ IDFWV¶ ta phainomena). However, Aristotle views akrasia as an intellectual failure 
UDWKHUWKDQDIDLOXUHRIGHVLUH,QGLVFXVVLQJ)UHXG¶VRZQFDVHRIEHLQJDIIOLFWHG E\WKHµEOLQGQHVVRIWKH
VHHLQJH\H¶LQKLVVWUXJJOHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHFDVHRI0LVV/XF\5
VNQRZLQJDQGQRWNQRZLQJKHUORYHIRU
her employer, Sherman explains: 
 
The Socratic dogma that knowledge can't be tyrannized by desire has long been abandoned. But 
against Kant, it is not simply the inner tribunal of conscience and moral judgment that will track 
down secret but motivating desires. Conflictual and concealed mental contents need a therapy of 
self-knowledge that does something other than continue to disavow them. They need to be heard 
from, in parliamentary fashion, and given their own voice as a part of coming to be united with 
avowed and endorsed interests. Therapeutically working through what is disavowed or repressed 
requires freedom from the stance of moral appraisal, even if the decision to submit to the analytic 
process might be thought of as a morally praiseworthy act in the most general sense of taking 
charge of one's character, and pursuing that project with courage. (Sherman, p. 13) But the 
outcome of the therapy when it succeeds is to produce a new type of agency. No longer split off 
from emotion's testimony, agency takes on a newer and bolder form. Psychoanalysis transforms 
the notion of moral agency by bringing the emotions to the center. In an ironic way, the " talking 
therapy" seems to be able to bring to moral agency those potential allies that moral theory, so 
often on its own, does not quite know how to train or enlist. (Sherman, pp. 22-23, emphasis ours). 
 
Therefore, for both types of subjects, it should be emphasized, the possibility of acting justly (or 
otherwise) remains open. In an unjust economy and society, most people are victims of 
oppression and injustice. In a nearly just society, such institutionalized injustice disappears, but 
there could still be unjust actions by individuals for which they should be culpable. However, in 
a well-ordered society, the view towards crime and punishment may be very different from ours. 
Instead of responding to issues of guilt with conventional punishment, a more compassionate, 
therapeutic approach may be taken.  
 
The point of this paper, of course, is not to produce a blueprint for a future just society, but to 
open up the possibility of such a discourse even under the postmodern conditions of epistemic 
uncertainty and anti-foundationalism. Enough has been said to show that even a radical epistemic 
uncertainty is consistent with the two kinds of subjects discussed. The previous discussion of a 
Hegelian approach to foundationalism was intended to show that anti-foundationalism is also 
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consistent with asystemic approach to economic and social justice. Thus, both at the level of 
large-VFDOH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF VWUXFWXUHV DQG DW WKH OHYHO RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V HSLVWHPRORJLFDO
uncertainties, anti-foundationalism need not lead to skepticism, relativism and ultimately 
nihilism. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have offered a somewhat novel theory of deep democracy from a political and social economy point 
of view. The theory of deep democracy presented here makes a distinction between formal aspects of 
democracy and the deeper structural aspects. In order for democracy to be deep, democratic practices 
have to become institutionalized in such a way that they become part of normal life in a democratic 
society. In this sense, onWRORJLFDOO\GHHSGHPRFUDF\RYHUODSVZLWK%DUEHU¶V LGHDRI VWURQJGHPRFUDF\
There are, however, epistemological differences as well as differences of emphasis, particularly in the 
economic sphere. Cluster conditions for deep democracy include both cultural-political and socio-
economic conditions.  
 
Our theory of deep democracy also answers important skeptical challenges of postmodern philosophers. 
Epistemologically, the postmodern dilemma arises from a correct critique of metaphysics and 
transcendentalism. However, the critique is partial and negative. It is partial in the sense that it does not 
take the challenge of Kant to develop normativity seriously enough to explore alternatives as Hegel did. 
It, therefore, pursues entirely the negative critical path leading to thoroughgoing skepticism and nihilism. 
 
In our approach, a concrete set of institutions consistent with the development of self-determination can 
be seen as necessary for the idea of deep democracy and economic justice to have meaning. In the spheres 
of production, distribution, exchange, law and contracts among others, the development of appropriate 
political, economic and social institutions allowing this inter-subjective idea of freedom to unfold 
becomes the thematic development of economic justice and democracy.  
 
An important problem in this context is the coherence of the concept of the moral subject. By carefully 
considering poststructuralist psychoanalytical theory of Lacan and others a dynamically oriented 
approach to the question of the subject becomes possible. Pre-Freudian thinkers such as Hegel or Marx 
GLGQRWVHHWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOLQDOOLWVGHHSO\SUREOHPDWLFDVSHFWV+RZHYHUWKHµVSHDNLQJ
VXEMHFW¶ WKRXJKQRW innocent (as Hélène Cixous wittily put it), is nevertheless capable of agency under 
specific social and economic conditions. A continuum of subjectivity ending with the fully liberated 
individual offers various possible levels of moral agency. In an economically and socially unjust setting 
radical analytic and social interventions will be necessary for these possibilities to materialize. 
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Deep democracy and economic justice, therefore, can be presented as a coherent set of positive 
requirements. It is part and parcel of the need for rational autonomy in our world. The cluster conditions 
we give together with the social capabilities perspective offer a way of defending and advancing the 
justification for deepening democracy. 
Notes: 
 
1. As interpreted by Khan (1998: 95). Here, Khan emphasizes the irreducibly social nature of certain capabilities. 
2. See, for example, Althusser's essays on ideology in For Marx and Lenin and Philosophy. Althusser seems to 
PLVFRQVWUXH/DFDQ¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHimaginary (and implicity, the mirror stage) in the former. 
3. It is not clear if Lacan himself would go so far, but most postmodernists, French and non-French alike (e.g., Foucault 
and Rorty), have taken this position. 
4. We hope it will become clear in the following discussion that actually there is a continuum of subjects within this 
dynamic setting. 
5. 2U WR EHPRUH SUHFLVH DQ µLQWHULRUPRQRORJXH¶ZKHUH WKH XQFRQVFLRXV SURFHVVHV DUH V\PEROL]HG LQWHUSUHWHG DQG
conceptualized. 
______________________________________________________ 
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